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Reactions to the lead article in this issue may vary greatly.  Some will findits conclusions surprising, while others will simply find new labels forconcepts they already understand.  Nancy Perry Lubiani and Patricia H.
Murrell apply the concepts of emotional intelligence to judges, including sug-
gestive evidence that judges who are rated best in bar association surveys are
the ones who score highest in emotional intelligence.  Another article follows
up on our Spring 2000 special issue on therapeutic jurisprudence: David
Wexler returns with some specific thoughts on how judges can promote
offender rehabilitation.
We continue our examination of ethical rules governing judicial speech
about pending or impending cases, which
began in our Summer 2000 and Winter 2001
issues.  In this issue we reprint the portions of
the appellate opinion in U.S. v. Microsoft dealing
with the trial judge’s comments to reporters.  In
a future issue, Professor William G. Ross,
whose article on judicial speech was cited by
the Microsoft court, will provide overall guid-
ance for judges on dealing with both the ethical
rules and the media.
The issue includes two essays.  Denver judge
Mary A. Celeste discusses the problem of unli-
censed, illegal immigrant drivers.  Pennsylvania
appellate judge Stephen J. McEwen, a past contributor to our pages, returns
with some thoughts about the war record of Chief Justice John Marshall.
I want to close with a few comments about the work-in-progress that is
Court Review.  This is the 13th issue that we’ve put out since I became the edi-
tor.  It has been a great learning experience for me, and I hope that you’ve
found the issues of interest as well.  I have received some helpful suggestions
recently from some of our Canadian members, and we certainly appreciate sug-
gestions about what would be of interest to you.  The Canadian members
rightly note that articles focused purely on facets of the United States legal sys-
tem are only of limited interest to them.  It’s a difficult problem—even though
we’ve had nice growth in our Canadian membership, it still represents less than
4% of total membership in the American Judges Association.  
We have attempted to meet the interests of our Canadian readers, along with
the rest of our readers, in a variety of ways.  We have increased coverage of psy-
chology and law topics, which cut across national boundaries and affect judges
at all levels.  We have also increased coverage of judicial ethics, having
included something on judicial ethics in three of the past four issues.  We wel-
come your input about topics you would like to see addressed here or authors
you’d like us to invite to write something for the judicial audience.  If you have
thoughts about those subjects or other comments on Court Review, please con-
tact me at sleben@ix.netcom.com.  I hope to hear from you—SL
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the
working judges of the United States.  In each issue, we
hope to provide information that will be of use to judges
in their everyday work, whether in highlighting new pro-
cedures or methods of trial, court, or case management,
providing substantive information regarding an area of
law likely to encountered by many judges, or by provid-
ing background information (such as psychology or other
social science research) that can be used by judges in
their work.  Guidelines for the submission of manuscripts
for Court Review are set forth on page 31.  Court Review
reserves the right to edit, condense, or reject material
submitted for publication.
Court Review is indexed in the Current Law Index, the
Legal Resource Index, and LegalTrac.
Letters to the Editor, intended for publication, are wel-
come.  Please send such letters to Court Review’s editor:
Judge Steve Leben, 100 North Kansas Avenue, Olathe,
Kansas 66061, e-mail address:  sleben@ix.netcom.com.
Comments and suggestions for the publication, not
intended for publication, also are welcome.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Deloris Gager at (757) 259-1864.
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This is a very exciting time for the American Judges
Association. 
I recently attended the  annual meeting of the Conference of
State Court Administrators (COSCA) and the Conference of
Chief Justices (CCJ) in Seattle, Washington.  At that meeting
there was a great concern and desire on the part of all the
national associations connected to the National Center for State
Courts to work more closely with each other on projects that
would be of joint concern to all associations.
To further this objective, COSCA’s Policy and Liaison
Committee appointed Dr. Hugh Collins of Louisiana as liaison to
the AJA. It is my hope that we continue this connection with
other associations and that we continue our liaison,
through our president and president-elect, not only
to CCJ and COSCA, but also to the State Justice
Institute, the National Association of State Judicial
Educators (NASJE), the National Association for
Court Management (NACM), the National
Conference of Court Public Information Officers, the
National College of Probate Judges, the National
Conference of Metropolitan Courts, the National
Court Reporters Association, the National Association of Drug
Court Professionals, and the National College of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges.  A closer relationship with these associa-
tions would be of great benefit to us.
We are now in the process, after approval by the Board of
Governors, of strengthening these relationships by having joint
meetings with other associations.  It is my honor to announce
to you that we are planning a joint meeting between AJA,
NACM, and NASJE at the year 2004 AJA Midyear Meeting in
Savannah, Georgia.  We anticipate that NASJE will be putting on
an educational program for AJA and NACM at this conference.
We will be looking for some education programs involving
issues of the courts and judicial-branch education through
NASJE.
The National Center for State Courts is very excited about
this joint session, with the hope that in the future AJA and
NACM will evolve into closely interacting groups, along with
NASJE, much as the relationship between CCJ and COSCA has
developed over the years.  I am very supportive of this proposi-
tion and hope that our association will follow and attempt to
strengthen our involvement with other members of the national
judicial community.
I believe our mission in these liaisons should be to provide
more of a national forum to assist state court judges in the
development of a more just, effective, and efficient system of
justice.  We can do that by identifying issues and developing
policy standards relating to the administration of the judicial
system and relating to the future education of judges through
the mainstream of core curriculum and not through the basis of
information that is beneficial for us to get reelected.  We need to
get back to the core subjects, like evidence, civil procedure,
criminal procedure, and procedure of courts.
It is my hope that in this network of exchange of
information from different associations, we will
transfer ideas and methods of improving state
courts.  This will take a lot of cooperation, consulta-
tion, and exchange of information among our orga-
nizations to assist us in perfecting judicial branch
education and to improve judicial understanding
concerning the court system.  I hope that we will be
more involved in implementation of national issues in the future
by our association with other judicial groups. 
Good relationships with these groups must be maintained in
order for us to be inclusive and more dynamic in the national
scene.  This will be a great opportunity for us to improve our
judicial education and at the same time to expand our national
presence.  In addition, I hope that in our expansion of our asso-
ciation we are able to encourage membership with both
Canadian and Mexican judges.   I will be attending a meeting
with the provincial trial judges in Canada in September.   From
that meeting, I hope that we are able to secure more member-
ship in the association and to encourage more Canadian judges
to be involved in AJA.
I’m excited about our future.  I hope that you will work hard
with me in trying to improve and expand our national appear-
ance and image as the only independent association of judges at
all levels.  I have enjoyed being your president and I will con-
tinue to work after my term to ensure that AJA stays in the fore-
front in the national scene.
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Hope for the future is an intrinsicpart of the reflection that hasaccompanied the beginning of a
new century.  Quite surely, our hope for
the future relies upon a trust that
Providence will provide individuals of
strength and character and integrity and
wisdom to lead us in this new century
and new millennium, just as such indi-
viduals were present to found and then
shape our United States of America.  As a
result, thoughts at this time inescapably
move to that time and to those individu-
als—and, for me, to a particular man,
John Marshall.
George Washington will forever be
remembered as the father of our country.
Thomas Jefferson will live through the
ages as the designer and author of our
Declaration of Independence.  More than
a few colonial patriots could be nomi-
nated to complete a trinity of our
founders, but surely the unanimous
choice of those who have embraced the
profession of the law must be John
Marshall, the patriot so aptly designated
by acclaimed author Jean Edward Smith
as “the definer of a nation.”
Every American school child since
1776 has learned of the historic role
played by the Liberty Bell in the founding
of our country.  Every school child since
1835 has been told that the crack in the
Liberty Bell appeared as that historic sym-
bol of freedom tolled the death of Chief
Justice John Marshall—and, thereby, the
adjournment of his 35-year term as the
fourth Chief Justice of the United States,
a tenure of historical proportion in itself,
for it spanned the terms of five presi-
dents: Thomas Jefferson, James Madison,
James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and
Andrew Jackson.
John Marshall was an individual of
many gifts, versatility, character, and
accomplishment.  A superb advocate, he
served his country as an American
Commissioner in Paris, Congressman,
Secretary of War, and Secretary of State.
Thus, the life of John Marshall goes
beyond epochal, while the legend of
Chief Justice John Marshall is ageless.  All
of which has obscured John Marshall the
Soldier.
By the time that a full decade of British
oppression had escalated to the April
1775 battles at Lexington and Concord,
and had inspired the bold, stirring decla-
mation of Patrick Henry to “Give me lib-
erty, or give me death,” John Marshall was
already second in command of training
and drilling a militia company of
Virginia’s Fauquier County.  Marshall had
learned the rudiments of military drill
from his father, Thomas Marshall, who
was himself a versatile and powerful man,
and the partner of George Washington in
the surveys of Virginia and Kentucky.
That military training in the spring of
1775 would serve John Marshall in the
next few months and over the next sev-
eral years as he became a combat soldier
in such fierce battles of the Revolutionary
War as:
THE BATTLE AT GREAT BRIDGE, 1775:
John Marshall first engaged in combat
against the British grenadiers at Great
Bridge, in the summer of 1775, as a first
lieutenant in the Fauquier Rifles of the
Culpeper Minutemen battalion.  The
Culpeper Minutemen badly defeated the
British, after several days of a battle later
described as a second Bunker Hill.  When
the smoke had cleared and the wounded
were under care, the Americans, upon the
initiative of Lieutenant John Marshall,
buried the British grenadiers, with full
military honors, so as to salute the dig-
nity of brave men who had died in battle
in the service of their country.
* * *
NEW JERSEY/NEW YORK, 1777:  
Lieutenant John Marshall and his
Fauquier unit of sharpshooters joined
Washington’s Army in April 1777; they
were dispatched through New York into
the Hudson Valley, their mission to reflect
the presence of a well-armed, mobile
force and thereby serve as a feint to the
main British force, which was stationed in
New York.
* * *
BATTLE OF IRON HILL, 
COOCH’S BRIDGE, DELAWARE, 1777:
The New York British command had tar-
geted Philadelphia, the capital and largest
city of the fledging Republic, and opted
for the strategy of sailing south from New
York to the Chesapeake and then march-
ing northward to Philadelphia.
Washington selected the area, along the
Pennsylvania/Delaware border, as the bat-
tleground, and, with the counsel of the
Marquis de Lafayette, dispatched a light
infantry force of 600 marksmen to harass
the British advance.  Marshall was one of
six lieutenants assigned to this corps,
which so valiantly carried out its mission
of swift movement and sudden strikes at
the British perimeter that the enemy com-
mander reported that half the Americans
“had shot themselves out of ammunition
and carried on the fight with sword and
bayonet.”  It was at this Battle of Iron Hill,
a prelude skirmish of the Battle at
Brandywine, that the Stars and Stripes
was first flown in battle, the Congress
having adopted it as the American flag on
June 14, 1777, just days prior to the bat-
tle.  How fitting that John Marshall, a
great nationalist Chief Justice, enjoys the
distinction of participating in the first
battle in which our Stars and Stripes were
unfurled.
* * *
BATTLE OF THE BRANDYWINE RIVER,
SEPTEMBER 11, 1777:
When the British commenced to cross the
Brandywine River in the dawn light of
September 11, 1777, Marshall’s unit was
assigned to delay and harass them at
Kennett.  The British and Hessian troops
eventually swept the main American
force from the field, except for one flare-
up—the light infantry of Marshall’s unit,
composing an ambush rear guard, held
the grenadiers at bay until finally obliged
to retreat under cover of darkness.  The
Continental Army of Washington was
Chief Justice John Marshall:
Soldier of the Revolution
Stephen J. McEwen, Jr.
C E S S AY
defeated at the Battle of Brandywine, but
the bravery of portions of the patriot
force, including the Virginia regiments,
enabled defeat without devastation.
* * *
GERMANTOWN, OCTOBER 1777:  
Washington, in an effort to dislodge the
British from Philadelphia, attacked the
main British camp on the outskirts of
Philadelphia in Germantown.  The most
fierce skirmish of that battle occurred in
the fields around the huge stone house of
Tory Pennsylvania Chief Justice Benjamin
Chew, a battle in which 53 Americans
were killed and John Marshall suffered
wounds. 
* * *
VALLEY FORGE, WINTER 1777-1778:  
The capture of Philadelphia by the British
forced Washington to move his winter
quarters to Valley Forge where the
absence of food and clothing and shoes,
and the presence of small pox, typhus,
dysentery, and scurvy, caused 3,000
American patriots to perish.  John
Marshall realized that, as a commander,
he was obliged to set an example for his
troops, and a splendid example he was,
for he has been described as a man “idol-
ized by his soldiers and brother officers,
whose gloomy hours were enlivened by
his inexhaustible fund of anecdotes.”
Some attribute his endurance to his
excellence as a runner; he also was
known as the only man in the
Continental Army who could high jump
over six feet.
* * *
MONMOUTH COUNTY, 
NEW JERSEY, SPRING 1778:
The Virginia militiamen were sent to New
Jersey to impede the British march to New
York, and while a bloody battle, which
Lafayette described as Washington’s finest
hour, was fought in Monmouth County,
New Jersey, Marshall and his men were
not directly engaged because they were
assigned to the flanks so as to prevent a
British retreat to the west.  It was during
this battle that Marshall was promoted to
the rank of captain.
* * *
STONY BROOK POINT, 
NEW YORK, SPRING 1779:
The fortification sites afforded by the
Hudson River had given great advantage
to the British, but in the spring of 1779,
Marshall and his regiment captured a
most important Hudson River fortifica-
tion, that of Stony Brook Point.
Thereafter, Marshall’s men served in the
force of Light-Horse Harry Lee, which
seized the British fortification of Paulus
Hook, a short distance from the
Continental Army camp at West Point.
* * *
When the winter of 1779 arrived,
Marshall was dispatched to Virginia to
thwart a suspected British plan to invade
the Carolinas. The invasion never came.
Marshall remained in Virginia until his
commission expired in February 1781;
thus, the 1779 New Jersey battles were
his final combat engagements.  Some
would assert, of course, that five years of
war was quite enough.
Marshall never psychologically mus-
tered out of the military.  He relished the
title of general that he subsequently
earned in the Virginia militia; he pep-
pered his conversation with military
metaphors; and he unfailingly, while on
the Supreme Court, went out of his way
to assist former soldiers with whom he
had fought, always quick to write lengthy
letters in longhand to the Secretary of
War attesting to the pension claims of
veterans of the Virginia line.
The five years that he had spent at war
and in bloody combat as a light infantry
officer certainly toughened John
Marshall, and while he was too modest to
talk about his accomplishments, he so
considered America as his country and
Congress as his government that, in his
words, “they constituted a part of my
being.”
The classic movie, Saving Private Ryan,
recently stirred the American soul.  As I
viewed the film, I sensed that the suffer-
ing and horror and death experienced by
the soldiers of the two armies, the
Continental Army of George Washington
and the GIs of General Dwight
Eisenhower, were equally horrible and
dreadful—just as the valor and bravery
and courage exhibited by those GIs was a
clear and certain reflection of the valor
and bravery and courage displayed by
Captain John Marshall and the light
infantry minutemen of Fauquier County.
Judge Stephen J.
McEwen, Jr., is President
Judge of the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, the inter-
mediate appellate court
in Pennsylvania.  He has
served on that court since
1981 and as its presiding
judge from 1996 through 2001. A graduate
of St. Joseph’s College (A.B.), the University
of Pennsylvania Law School (LL.B.), and
the University of Virginia Law School
Graduate Program for Judges (LL.M.),
Judge McEwen was a trial lawyer, professor
of trial advocacy at Villanova University
Law School, twice elected District Attorney
of Delaware County, and General Counsel
for the Pennsylvania District Attorneys
Association.
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AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION
Future Conferences
2001 ANNUAL MEETING
September 30-October 5
Reno, Nevada - Silver Legacy Resort
($89.00 single or double)
2002 MIDYEAR MEETING
April 18-20
Biloxi, Mississippi
Beau Rivage Resort & Casino
($119.00 single or double)
2002 ANNUAL MEETING
September 8-13
Maui, Hawaii - The Westin Maui
($155.00 single or double – 
golf/mountain view;
$169.00 single or double – ocean view)
2003 MIDYEAR MEETING
Billings, Montana
(Dates and hotel to be determined)
2003 ANNUAL CONFERENCE
Montreal, Quebec
(Dates and hotel to be determined)
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1. “FAIR Calls on Governor Sundquist to Veto Illegal Alien Driver’s
License Bill,” U.S. Newswire, April 27, 2001.
2. Bruce Finley, “Mexican President Heads to U.S.,” DENVER POST,
July 11, 2001, at 1A.
3. Id.
4. Eric Schmitt, “Residency Sought for Illegals,” DENVER POST, July
15, 2001.  Chances of success for such a proposal are reportedly
uncertain: “There is stiff opposition from anti-immigrant groups
and influential Republicans in Congress.”  Id.
5. Monica Whitaker, “Driver’s License Law Easing for Aliens;
Legislators Put Motorists’ Safety over Legal Status of
Immigrants,” THE TENNESSEAN, April 24, 2001.
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may be revoked under Colo. Rev. Stat. section 42-2-138.
9. In Colorado, for example, three points are assessed for the first
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for a second violation within two years.  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-
101.  An additional four points are assessed for the no-insurance
violation.  Id. § 42- 2-1409.  Thus, it is very conceivable that a
person convicted of those offenses could easily accumulate 12
points in one year or 18 points in two years, the levels at which
licenses in place are suspended and obtaining one becomes
impossible.  See id. § 42-2-127.
10. James R. Edwards, “The Downside of Easy Driver’s Licenses,”
COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), May 18, 2001.
11. 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts 158, Sen. Bill 1266 (passed May 3, 2001).
There are currently as many as 13 mil-lion illegal immigrants in the UnitedStates;1 5 million are illegal Mexican
immigrants, with 46,000 living in my
home state of Colorado.2 There is a push
by the Mexican government at both the
state and federal levels to change the legal
status of those immigrants.   President
Vicente Fox of Mexico recently added the
issue of permitting undocumented
migrants to apply for a driver’s license to
his agenda for a meeting with governors
from the United States.3 On the federal
level, President Bush is now weighing
plans to grant legal residency  to Mexican
illegal immigrants in the United States,
including a “guest worker” program.4
There are an abundant number of vio-
lations issued to illegal and legal immi-
grants for driving without a valid driver’s
license.  At first blush, the problem seems
to stem from the fact that Social Security
cards are a precursor for a driver’s license.
Although legal immigrants are eligible for
a Social Security card, it typically takes
several years to obtain one because of the
complex Immigration and Naturalization
Service process required to get it.5
Moreover, illegal immigrants may not be
eligible for one at all.  Some states have
specifically excluded illegal immigrants
from obtaining one.6 Although the Social
Security card requirement has never been
aimed at preventing illegal or legal immi-
grants from obtaining a driver’s license, it
became an end result. The problem began
to present itself about six years ago when
Congress decided that Social Security
numbers should be used to track people
whose child support payments were in
arrears.7 Perhaps the intention  was for
child support enforcement through the
attachment of federal tax refunds.8
These types of convictions create
extraordinary consequences for immi-
grants and the judicial system.  For
example, in order to purchase auto insur-
ance in Colorado, one must supply the
insurance company with a valid driver’s
license; therefore, many times a violation
for having no valid license is accompa-
nied with a violation for having no valid
auto insurance. This scenario has both an
economic impact and an incongruous
legal result.  For example, if an accident
is involved and the immigrant driver is at
fault, the victim may be left without
insurance reimbursement.   Further,
within a short period of time, an immi-
grant may accumulate enough points to
have a license suspended for excessive
points.9 This point accrual may continue
until such time that the driving “privi-
lege” is revoked even though there is no
license to revoke.  Nonetheless, the dri-
ving may continue and the immigrant
may pay higher and higher fines, ulti-
mately facing potential incarceration. To
ask why immigrants drive without a valid
license and, in some cases, continue to
drive even after several convictions, is
begging the question.  The primary rea-
son people immigrate to the United
States is to improve their economic con-
dition.  The way to accomplish that is
through employment, and the automo-
bile is almost a necessity for travel to and
from that employment.
The driver’s license issue for immi-
grants is not peculiar to Colorado.
Recently, there has been political, social,
and legal activity related to it in the states
of Arizona, Georgia, Illinois,  Minnesota,
Tennessee, and Utah, each of which has
taken differing positions.  Illinois elected
to enforce its existing driving laws.  The
Illinois Secretary of State ordered 80 sus-
pected illegal immigrants to take a new
driver’s license exam.  To do so, they had
to show valid Social Security cards or
other identification documents. Of the 25
who showed up, 15 people were arrested
on document fraud charges.  The remain-
ing  55  were suspected of being illegal
and the state canceled their licenses.10 In
Tennessee, the legislature passed a bill
eliminating the need for a Social Security
card as the only means of securing a state
driver’s license.11 The expanded identifi-
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cation options in Tennessee now include
Immigration and Naturalization Service
documents, resident alien cards, and mil-
itary papers issued by a foreign country.12
At a recent rally in Minnesota, illegal
immigrants argued that the Minnesota
Department of Public Safety should make
it easier for them to obtain a driver’s
license.13 In response to the rally, the
head of the Department of Public Safety
said that “state law enforcement agencies
cannot institute policies that contradict
federal law.”14 In Arizona, there have
been two attempts to pass legislation that
would eliminate the legal residency
requirement for driver’s license appli-
cants,15 while Utah has in fact already
adopted this type of law.16
Some argue that permitting immi-
grants to obtain a driver’s license is
prompted by public safety concerns: a
valid license would make the immigrants
safer drivers; they would  become familiar
with driving regulations; and they could
obtain the proper auto insurance.17
Additionally  it may circumvent  the man-
ufacturing of fraudulent documents.  For
example, the United States Immigration
and Naturalization Service broke up a
fake ID ring, finding 4,000 blank Social
Security cards and other false documents,
including green cards.18 These measures
may effect the elimination of false docu-
ments, which may in turn reduce the
exploitation of immigrants.  In  contrast,
others have argued that there is no corre-
lation between a valid driver’s license and
safe driving;19 that relaxed licensing rules
would encourage and facilitate illegal
immigration; and that it might make it
easier to create false identities, thereby
making the driver’s license an inauthentic
form of identification.20
This issue has also crept into case law.
Last year, an illegal immigrant who was
charged with driving under the influence
argued that the Georgia driving statute
defining “resident” excluded illegal
immigrants; therefore, he argued, he was
not required to seek a valid license and
was not subject to the driving laws.21 The
Georgia Court of Appeals rejected the
argument, finding that “the intention of
the General Assembly was not to exempt
undocumented aliens from the require-
ment of obtaining a Georgia driver’s
license but to permit visitors, with no
intention of becoming residents, to drive
here without obtaining a Georgia
license.”22 The court went on to say that
“[t]o interpret the statutes otherwise
would create an absurdity: Citizens and
documented aliens would be required to
obtain valid Georgia licenses after living
in this state for 30 days, while undocu-
mented aliens would be permitted to
drive forever without a valid Georgia
license.”23 In another case, illegal immi-
grants sought to have a class action certi-
fied against the Georgia State Department
of Public Safety and its director, alleging
that  enforcement of state statutes pro-
hibiting the issuance of driver’s licenses
to illegal immigrants was unconstitu-
tional, based on equal protection and
right-to-travel claims.24 In June 2001, a
federal court found that the illegal immi-
grants were not a suspect class requiring
strict scrutiny and dismissed the com-
plaint.25 The court noted Edwards v.
California,26 the Supreme Court case
establishing travel as a fundamental right,
but held that, under Edwards, “the right
to travel is derived from federal citizen-
ship.”27 The court also noted that there
were legitimate state interests furthered
by the statute, including “not allowing its
governmental machinery to be a facilita-
tor for the concealment of illegal aliens”
and limiting its services to citizens and
legal residents.28
To avoid a continued eruption of the
issue,  the motor vehicle or public safety
departments in each state could adopt a
policy similar to Illinois and “crack
down” on illegal immigrants who drive
without a valid license.  But if the federal
Immigration and Naturalization Service
is not an effective deterrent to illegal
immigration, would a state motor vehicle
department serve as an effective deterrent
to illegal driving?.  Attorneys and the
judiciary could urge state legislators to
enact legislation similar to that recently
enacted in Tennessee, expanding identifi-
cation beyond Social Security cards; how-
ever, if the immigrant does not have a
complying form of identification, as man-
dated by the statute, those immigrants
remain in the same position.  Each state
could just let undocumented immigrants
apply for driver’s licenses, as they do in
Utah.  Judges could take under consider-
ation the extraordinary circumstances of
the immigrant defendant and simply ren-
der lenient sentences.  There may be
other creative state solutions as well.  
State solutions, however,  would only
serve as a band-aid to a much broader
underlying cause: the immigration law
itself.  Although it is somewhat beyond
the scope of this essay, a cursory overview
of this law seems important.  With some
exception, there are five requirements for
naturalization:  the English language
requirement, the civics requirement,  ide-
ological qualifications, an oath renounc-
ing allegiance to the country of origin,
and a residency and good moral character
requirement.29 Denials of applications
for citizenship began to soar during early
1999,30 and  one-third were attributable
Spring 2001 - Court Review 7
31. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV. &
PRICE WATERHOUSE, LLP, A BLUPRINT FOR THE NEW NATURALIZATION
PROCESS: NATURALIZATION INTERVIEW OUTCOME SURVEY II at 8 (Aug.
21, 1998 draft).  In 1997, naturalization applications numbered
1.6 million, a 600% increase over the 1990 level.  Id.  See also
CONG. RES. SERV., NATURALIZATION TRENDS, ISSUES, AND LEGISLATION
2 (1998).
32. See Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,
49 REV. POLITICS 251 (1987); JOHN J. MILLER, THE UNMAKING OF
AMERICANS: HOW MULTICULTURALISM HAS UNDERMINED THE
ASSIMILATION ETHIC 147-73 (1998); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL
SOCIETY (rev. ed. 1998).
33. Spiro, supra note 29, at 517.
34. Miller, supra note 32, at 150.
35. See, e.g., GEORGIE ANNE GEYER, AMERICANS NO MORE 137-89
(1996).
36. Spiro, supra note 29, at 481.
37. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 131 (1941) Cf. Miller
v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 459 (1998)(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
and id. at 471 (Breyer, J., dissenting)(three justices in dissent
found that equal protection clause would invalidate more restric-
tive citizenship admission standard for child of U.S. father and
alien mother than for child of U.S. mother and alien father).  
38. Weaver, supra note 13.
to a failure of the English language or
civics test.31
Many scholarly reviews have been
published, both pro and con, questioning
the immigration laws.32 Those advocat-
ing lowering or eliminating the require-
ments argue  that the “requirements are
ineffective and/or unnecessary to main-
taining the integrity of the national com-
munity and its political foundations” and
that “such ineffective or unnecessary bar-
riers cannot be sustained where they
compromise the rights of individuals.”33
It has been said that these requirements
are equivalent to being an “American
moving to Japan, learning to speak the
language as well as read and write kanji
script, and reciting facts about the shogu-
nate, the Maiji restoration, and  Admiral
Togo.”34 Those who seek to reinforce or
expand the requirements argue that those
requirements prevent the fragmentation
of the American polity.35
While it is difficult to speculate as to
the number of illegal and legal immi-
grants who are operating motor vehicles
across the country, it is fair to say that,
due to their immigration status, many of
those immigrants are operating a motor
vehicle without a valid driver’s license.
This issue presents cascading economic,
social, political, and legal effects.  Traffic
convictions for these offenses create both
an economic impact and an incongruous
legal result, at least in Colorado, and at
most throughout the country.  State pub-
lic safety departments may enforce their
laws on immigrants who drive without a
valid license; state courts may continue
to address the driver’s license issue  in a
piecemeal fashion; state legislatures may
pass bills expanding identification
requirements for a driver’s license; and
the judiciary may render lenient  sen-
tences.  These remedies, however, are
only the tip of the iceberg.  
As we view the underlying layers, we
are left with a reflection of the existing
immigration laws and their overarching
impact on immigrants as well as the polit-
ical and judicial system.  While state leg-
islators, courts, and agencies are posi-
tioned to address the driver’s license issue,
they do not have any power with regard to
the immigration laws themselves.  Other
writers have aptly summarized the basic
situation:  “As with all matters relating to
immigration, the courts have exercised
almost no oversight of naturalization poli-
cies.”36 “Naturalization is a privilege, to
be given or withheld on such conditions
as Congress sees fit.”37 “So long as federal
policy classifies persons as illegal aliens
they will be viewed as such by the state.”38
Thus, this seemingly negligible issue is
ultimately in the hands of the federal gov-
ernment: hands that change with the tides
of politics.
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Footnotes 
1. William C. Bayme, Jury Sees Life Ruined in Crash/Disabled Nurse
Appears as Testimony Ends, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis,
Tenn.), April 13, 2000 at A1.
Recently, in a courtroom in Tennessee, a defendant wasconvicted of a DUI assault after a tragic accident thattook the life of a young woman—at least life as she knew
it before the accident. Evidence presented by the prosecution
did not include a blood alcohol test, a Breathalyzer test, a field
sobriety test, or any witnesses at the scene testifying that the
defendant appeared to be under the influence of alcohol,
although testimony from eyewitnesses did suggest that earlier
in the evening the defendant did appear to be intoxicated. The
lawyer for the prosecution simply brought the victim of the
accident into the courtroom.
The 31-year-old wife, mother, and nurse was rolled before
judge and jury in her wheelchair. As a result of the accident,
she could no longer speak, stand, or sit up. She stayed in the
courtroom one minute and fourteen seconds.1 The jury delib-
erated 3 hours and 25 minutes before convicting the defen-
dant. He was later sentenced to 12 years of a possible 25-year
sentence.2 The defense had argued, unsuccessfully, for a
directed verdict, asking that the “sympathy factor” be removed
from the courtroom. In this case, the lawyer clearly recognized
and identified the primary emotion working on decision mak-
ers and the effect it would likely have on his case. Feelings are
not always so easily identified and named, but whether or not
we are cognizant of emotions, they impact almost every
encounter and every decision we face.
Robert Levy, a psychiatrist and anthropologist, reported that
in Tahiti “there is no concept or word for sadness in the cul-
ture. The signs—loss of appetite, sad expressions, inactivity—
were present, but they ‘could not name the feeling.’ The symp-
toms were considered to be due to a sickness. This is a power-
ful demonstration of how cultural differences influence emo-
tional experience.”3
American culture certainly has a word for sadness. In fact,
we have several words, depression, dejection, sorrow, melan-
choly, despondency, and even a few colloquial phrases: “the
blues,” “down in the dumps.”  Sadness is probably one of the
mildest emotions that judges see in their courtroom. On any
given day they might also see anger, frustration, fear, impa-
tience, apathy, boredom, awe, respect, intimidation, perhaps
even some of the more welcome emotions, such as happiness,
relief, or even joy, and that is just when the judge is on the
bench. The list could go on and on. Other aspects of judicial
work open up areas where emotions play a part as well. In fact,
any activity that draws on a personal perspective or requires
one to relate to others will draw on emotional experience.  
Judges’ awareness of these emotions, both their own and
other people’s, can influence how well they manage them-
selves, the people before them, and the judicial process. It may
even contribute to what sets a judge apart in the eyes of his or
her constituency as a well-qualified judge, what builds public
trust and confidence and respect for him or her as a leader in
the community. This awareness and regulation of emotion is
foundational to a set of leadership qualities most recently
defined as emotional intelligence. 
JUDGES AS LEADERS
Leadership characteristics are universally valued, whether
in the boardroom, the courtroom, or the community at large.
Often now, the judge is, in all of these positions, sometimes
perceived to be the member of a team rather than a command-
ing presence from the bench issuing edicts. According to Judge
Paul Lipscomb, presiding judge of the Marion County courts
in Oregon, “Judges are taking a more active leadership role in
the community, intervening to form coalitions and partner-
ships, mediating disputes, gathering allies and drawing people
together.” In this scenario, collaboration is vital, community
presence significant, and the ability to draw upon leadership
qualities critical to a judge’s professional success. 
Leadership development itself, starting out as what may
have seemed to be the hot new topic for management training,
has embedded itself firmly in our professional consciousness.
So what exactly is leadership?  And how does it present itself
to us in a recognizable form? 
The skills we value in leaders are related as much to who a
person is as to what a person does. Leadership is a way of being
as much as it is a way of doing. A person has acquired more
than just a new set of skills, but has developed in ways that
have transformed who they are, and this comes out in what
they do, particularly how they relate to other people. 
At the Leadership Institute in Judicial Education, housed at
the University of Memphis and funded by the State Justice
Institute, leadership is defined as “the capacity to discern and
develop one’s resources, whether human or material. It further
involves the ability to marshal those resources in realizing a
vision, reaching a goal, or resolving a problem. It starts with
who we are and then moves to what we do.”  The idea of peo-
ple as our most important resource has become almost a cliché,
but we all know that relationships with others are critical to
our success at work. How we handle those relationships, how
we “marshal” the resources of the people we come into contact
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5. HAROLD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND 68-69 (1985).
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with can set apart a good leader from an excellent one.  
In fact, some of the latest research in leadership indicates
that the skills that set apart the good from the best are the
result of a different kind of mental activity, a function of the
affective, rather than the cognitive, the emotional rather than
the reasoning capabilities. This research does not negate the
necessity of reasoning capabilities but serves instead to elevate
the connection that emotion has to the function of reasoning. 
Grade points, technical skills, and intellectual abilities have
long been considered traditional thresholds for success. What
we are learning, however, is that the higher the position of a
person in an organization, technical skills become relatively
less important.4 Better effectiveness is determined by a set of
competencies; once again, what we are referring to as emotional
intelligence. 
So what is emotional intelligence, how does it apply to the
court, and how do we determine our own competency and
skill in this critical area of leadership?
CONNECTING EMOTIONS WITH INTELLIGENCE
Cognition, or reasoning and judgment, is typically the kind
of mental activity associated with the word intelligence.
Howard Gardner, author of Frames of Mind, says that we must
be careful to use the word intelligence as a means of labeling a
phenomenon that may (but may well not) exist. To treat the
concept of intelligence as a tangible, measurable quality is to
give it more significance than it can hold. Ultimately, all intel-
ligences (Gardner identifies seven in his book) must be viewed
in the light of culture, how they provide us with opportunities
to live well with and for the good of our society and ourselves.
“The possession of an intelligence is best thought of as a poten-
tial,” the difference between “knowing-that” and “knowing-
how.”5
John D. (Jack) Mayer, a researcher who, in partnership
with Peter Salovey, provided the first formal definition and
experimental measure of emotional intelligence, outlines the
extremes of the different definitions of emotions. He explains
that a biology-oriented researcher will define emotions as
electrochemical reactions, while psychologists will define
emotions as a conscious experience.  He seems to suggest that
emotions connect thought, feeling, and action: “Most people
who study emotions are somewhere in between and they view
emotions as a coordinated response system, so that an emo-
tion occurs when there are certain biological, certain experi-
ential, certain cognitive states which all occur simultane-
ously.”6 Mayer and Salovey define emotional intelligence as
“the ability to perceive emotions, to access and generate emo-
tions so as to assist thought, to understand emotions and
emotional knowledge, and to reflectively regulate emotions so
as to promote emotional and
intellectual growth . . . com-
bining the idea that emotion
makes thinking more intelli-
gent and that one thinks
intelligently about emo-
tions.”7
The Latin term for emo-
tions, motus anima, means lit-
erally “the spirit that moves
us,” so we can say that emo-
tion is the movement of our
feelings.8 Emotional intelli-
gence, based on Salovey and
Mayer’s work, can be described as knowing we are moved by
our feelings and understanding the impact on ourselves and
others. Almost everyone hits a performance plateau eventually;
the difference for the few that do not seems to be their emo-
tional intelligence.
In their book, Executive EQ: Emotional Intelligence in
Leadership and Organizations, Robert K. Cooper and Ayman
Sawaf define emotional intelligence as “the ability to sense,
understand, and effectively apply the power and acumen of
emotions as a source of human energy, information, connec-
tion, and influence.”9 They argue that “reasoning has its power
and value only in the context of emotion. No matter what the
product, idea, service, or cause, we buy—or buy in—based on
feelings; and then, if possible, we rationalize or justify our
choices with numbers and facts.  No one talks about the ratio-
nale of a passionate relationship or hobby, or brags about a rea-
sonable marriage or logical vacation, or requires a statistical
analysis of deeply felt human longings and dreams.”10
Daniel Goleman, in his book Working with Emotional
Intelligence, defines emotional intelligence as two distinct
competencies: the personal competencies of self-awareness,
self-regulation, and motivation, and the social competencies
of empathy and social skills.11 Some of Goleman’s research
has been highlighted in the Harvard Business Review.
Analyzing leadership competency models from 188 compa-
nies in order to identify the distinguishing leadership charac-
teristics in the organizations, performance proficiencies were
collated into the categories of technical skill, IQ, or emo-
tional intelligence. When these three factors were calculated
in ratios as the components of excellent performance, emo-
tional intelligence was twice as important as the others for
jobs at all levels. Finally, by the time a person reached a senior
leadership position, 90% of the difference in star performer
versus average performer was due to a proficiency in emo-
tional intelligence capabilities.12
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EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
AND THE COURTS
So, what the recent gurus
of emotional intelligence tell
us is that those who are skilled
in connecting what they know
and how they feel, and who
can translate that connection
into more productive behav-
ior, will be more effective at
work. But wait. The court-
room, we say, is different from
the rest of the working world.
A judge must be autonomous
and independent in order to
receive and retain public trust and confidence. In no circum-
stance should a personal bias, emotional or otherwise, influ-
ence a decision or a ruling, or even the procedural management
of the court. How, then, can understanding or implementing
emotional intelligence skills be relevant to a judge? Goleman’s
theories about star performers holds its weight just as well in
the court system. 
Judges, lawyers, and other court professionals may take the
courtroom for granted, while those who do not have daily
interaction with the court may be a little in awe of the system.
Someone looking down from on high, physically or figuratively,
rendering a judgment on one’s life, has the capacity to either set
one at ease, to intimidate one, or to manipulate the situation in
many different ways. If courts are to retain the respect and
honor that they deserve—and that is necessary to maintain
their position as moderators of society—then a mantle of judi-
cial demeanor, temperament and fairness is important.
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
All over the country, bar associations and other professional
organizations in the legal community administer surveys and
evaluations on the performance of judges. Usually the qualities
fall into the broad general categories of legal knowledge, ability
and/or experience, work ethic, integrity, fairness, and
demeanor (sometimes called judicial temperament). These sur-
veys are then published broadly among the judges’ constituents
in an effort to assist voters in deciding who are the best candi-
dates and how to vote. The results of two such surveys will be
analyzed here for the importance of qualities related to emo-
tional intelligence. First, though, an analysis will be provided
for a survey that polled voters in an effort to find out what they
would like to know about judicial candidates, and how they
use the information they do have in an election. 
Founded in 1874, the 22,000-member Chicago Bar
Association is the largest metropolitan bar association in the
country. Their published purpose and objective is to establish
and maintain the honor and dignity of the profession.13 In
1998, the Chicago Bar contracted with an outside firm to
administer a random survey of voters. One question asked was
about which qualities were most important in selecting judges.
Demeanor, described as fairness, lack of bias and behavior
toward others in the courtroom, was extremely important
among 65% to 70% of the surveyed voters. Legal experience was
the second most important characteristic in selecting a judge:
courtroom experience was extremely important to 55%, and
time practicing law was extremely important to 41% of the
respondents. A significant number of the voters polled (42% to
46%) ranked opinions on social issues, such as the death
penalty, business and/or labor issues, abortion or gay rights, as
extremely important. (Of course, these are the kinds of issues
on which judges are prohibited from expressing their opinions,
and these topics tend to be more likely to evoke passionate
responses on either side. Consequently, how judges manage
their own emotional responses as well as the responses of oth-
ers—be it the prosecution, the defense, the jury, the media, or
the public—is especially important.) 
Political experience or party affiliation ranked fairly low as
an issue extremely important to voters (20%), and grades in law
school were at the bottom of the list at 18%. This survey indi-
cates that for those characteristics considered extremely impor-
tant to voters, there is a range of at least 15 points and up to 30
points verifying the importance of behavioral qualities. What
we are calling emotional intelligence is more important than
technical skills and experience, and just as important, if not
more so, than a judges’ record on decisions regarding social
issues.14
Most voters in the survey responded that their primary
source of information regarding judges was media coverage
(28%).  Regarding recommendations, 21% said they paid atten-
tion to newspaper endorsements and 20% relied on ratings by
lawyers’ associations, which are a common practice in many
states. 
One such organized effort is organized by the Chicago
Council of Lawyers, which has a 200-member committee that
spends thousands of volunteer hours evaluating judicial candi-
dates. The Chicago Council collaborated in a joint process with
the Alliance of Bar Associations and reported these findings on
judicial candidates in a recent primary.15 Their criteria can be
divided into the two categories that Goleman used in his
research: technical skills (legal knowledge, ability, and profes-
sional experience) and qualities of emotional intelligence (judi-
cial temperament, diligence, sensitivity to diversity and bias,
integrity, respect for the rule of law, political and institutional
independence, character and professional conduct.)  Of 88
judges evaluated, 23 were classified as not recommended based
on lack of participation; the remaining 65 chose to participate
in the process by submitting information in support of their
candidacy.
A look at the narratives of the 65 participating judges in the
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committee report supports Goleman’s theory that technical
skills are a threshold to leadership positions; the qualities of
emotional intelligence are what make a leader exceptional.
Those judges up for election who were considered not qualified
were lacking technical skills twice as often (14 out of 24) as
they lacked interpersonal skills (7 out of 24); in two cases, the
narrative indicated a lack in both areas.  If judges lacked suffi-
cient legal ability or courtroom experience, they were auto-
matically  considered not qualified, and if they met the require-
ments for such technical skills but had not demonstrated qual-
ities indicating emotional intelligence, then they were also
considered not qualified. 
A lack of emotional intelligence did not make up for lack in
technical skills, although in at least one instance a judge’s
interpersonal competency and commitment overcame an
apparent lack in the grasp of some legal issues. Of the 24
judges classified qualified, the narrative recommending all but
3 indicated proficiency in both technical skills, such as legal
ability and experience in the courtroom, as well as skills
demonstrating emotional intelligence, such as judicial tem-
perament, demeanor, bias, etc. The two narratives that only
mentioned legal abilities and experience were for judges who
had supervisory experience, indicating some adeptness in
interpersonal relationships. As stated previously, one judge’s
narrative indicated some problems grasping legal issues, but
the overwhelmingly positive response to his work ethic,
integrity, and service to the community allowed the review
committee to consider him qualified. 
The greatest correlation with Goleman’s theory comes when
the evaluations of  the judges ranked well qualified (13, or 20%
of those rated) and highly qualified (4, or 3% of those rated) are
reviewed. All judges in these categories did exhibit superior
legal ability, considerable experience in the courtroom, and
had excellent reputations for their interpersonal relationships
and personal presentation. However, one more quality of emo-
tional intelligence that seemed to set them over the top in qual-
ification was their extra effort in promoting the judiciary out-
side of the courtroom, sometimes even outside of the legal
community. This extra effort, or motivation, is a weighty com-
ponent of emotional intelligence. Often, this effort plays out in
generative acts, such as teaching, writing articles, and organiz-
ing efforts of community involvement. These judges were also
cited for providing creative solutions, such as mediation, and
for participating in professional associations or community
activities.  In addition, they had a broad range of experience,
which might indicate a degree of risk taking.
Another survey, on a smaller scale, conducted by the
Northern San Diego County Bar Association reflects interest in
the same kinds of traits and characteristics regarding judges.16
The rankings of exceptionally well qualified, well qualified, qual-
ified, and not qualified were assigned by lawyers asked to rank
judges on intellectual and legal knowledge, industriousness and
diligence, temperament and demeanor, and fairness and lack of
bias. There was a significant trend in how affective behaviors
influenced the perceptions of whether or not a judge was qual-
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ified for his job. Of the
judges whose composite
ratings were qualified or
well-qualified, knowledge
and experience were, at
best, almost equal in impor-
tance to an understanding
and a competence level of
more affective behaviors.
More significantly, of the
votes that measured a judge
to be on the extreme, either
exceptionally well qualified
or not qualified at all, profi-
ciencies in emotional intel-
ligence—or lack of the same—were the defining factor. 
The message is that judges can perform adequately or even
well in their work, but to be exceptional, to reach a level of
excellence, they must have something besides a basic skill
knowledge. They must demonstrate a way of relating to others
that allows their performance to be noticed beyond the techni-
cal ability to carry out their day-to-day responsibilities. This is
a double-edged sword: their lack of diligence, fairness, or judi-
cial temperament may overshadow whatever skills and experi-
ence they possess. Technical abilities will not serve them well
if they do not also know how to relate to other people, partic-
ularly in such an emotion-laden situation as the courtroom.
EQ MAP®
If we have established that competency in managing emo-
tions, both our own and others, is important, then how do we
determine if we are operating at our full potential, and, if not,
how do we augment our performance in that area? We may or
may not have been fortunate enough in our life experiences to
have been taught these more developed and desirable ways of
relating to ourselves and to other people; the good news about
emotional intelligence is that it can be learned. Chances are we
can look back over the experiences we have had, and with
reflection, see where we have performed with wisdom and
maturity, or see the challenges we face. 
Once we have decided to evaluate ourselves, we may need a
guide. Robert Cooper, along with Esther Orioli and others, has
developed an instrument, EQ Map, to help us in that way. The
EQ Map is challenging, and at the same time supportive, in
helping us to evaluate personally and privately both our com-
petencies and our areas of potential growth. EQ Map is more
qualitative than quantitative; the scale of performance is a range
of optimal, proficient, vulnerable, and caution, and the cate-
gories explored are current environment, awareness, competen-
cies, values, and attitudes and outcomes. The EQ Map exam-
ines several categories of proficiency in emotional intelligence:
Current Environment.  First, EQ Map has us take
a look at our current environment, our life pres-
sures, and our life satisfactions. Life pressures are
the stresses and strains in every area of our life that
Technical abilities
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we experience as con-
straining, difficult, or
draining. Life satisfac-
tions are those relation-
ships or circumstances
that we experience as
pleasurable and fulfill-
ing. 
Dimensions of Aware-
ness. Another category
of review is awareness.
Self-awareness is the
degree to which we are
able to notice our feel-
ings, label them, and
connect to their source. Awareness of others is
being able to sense what they may be feeling from
their body language, their words, or other direct or
indirect cues. Expression encompasses both self-
awareness and awareness of others, and explores
the ability to speak, using this new information in
productive ways. 
Competencies for Growth and Development. Our
competencies in emotional intelligence explore fun-
damental skills and behavior patterns we have
developed over time to respond to the people,
events, and circumstances of our life. They include
our ability to act with purpose, or intention, our
creativity, and an ability to be flexible or our
resilience.  Other competencies involve interper-
sonal connections or those people with whom we
can express caring and appreciation; vulnerabilities
and hopes; and finally constructive discontent, or
our ability to stay calm and emotionally grounded
even in the face of disagreement or conflict.
Values and Attitudes. The personal principles that
frame our lives and guide our actions are our system
of values and beliefs. Our belief about how to inter-
pret life events is our outlook: is the glass half-
empty or half-full? Compassion, or empathy, is
about valuing another person’s feelings and point of
view, and being forgiving of yourself and others.
Intuition is the degree to which we trust and use
hunches, our  “gut feelings.”  The degree to which
we believe and expect other people will be trust-
worthy, or our inclination to trust until we have
specific reason not to, is our trust radius. A calm
conviction about who we are and our ability to get
the things we want and need in life indicates a level
of personal power.  Finally, our level of self-integra-
tion is the degree to which our intellectual, emo-
tional, spiritual, and creative selves fit together to
support our personal values. 
Outcomes. Finally, the EQ Map measures the out-
come, or the impact, that emotional intelligence is
having on our life, our general health, quality of life,
and the quality and depth of our interpersonal con-
nections with others.17
EQ Map is one instrument that can give us an indication of
the strengths and challenges we have in the area of emotional
intelligence; there are many others. These devices can be very
helpful as they help us discern where we are and give us indi-
cations of what to strive for in terms of improvement. 
JUDICIAL BRANCH EDUCATION
What can judicial branch education offer regarding EQ and
court leadership? Daniel Goleman has been emphatic in assert-
ing that emotional intelligence can be learned, and further, that
it can be increased across the life span. That’s the good news
for providers of education in the court system. The perplexing
question is, “How do we do it?” 
David Kolb’s experiential learning model offers a framework
that can be useful in developing the kinds of affective out-
comes that are identified with emotional intelligence. Kolb
suggests that learning is a cyclical process involving concrete
experience, reflective observation, abstract conceptualization,
and active experimentation. The concrete experience and
reflective observation modes seem especially useful as a way to
recognize, acknowledge, and name feelings or emotions, and
to question the appropriateness of those emotions. Three
examples of judicial education programs will illustrate this
process.
At the Leadership Institute in Judicial Education, partici-
pants visit the National Civil Rights Museum that commemo-
rates the 1968 sanitation workers’ strike in Memphis and the
life of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The museum is designed to
be participatory. There is the opportunity to sit on a
Montgomery, Alabama, city bus and hear the driver demand
that you move to the back of the bus. There is a lunch counter
with stools on which one can perch and observe a film of the
degradation and insults that African American customers
received. Finally, there is the room in which Dr. King was stay-
ing, the balcony on which he was shot, and the view of the
boarding house window from which the fatal bullet was fired.
Mahalia Jackson sings, “Take My Hand, Precious Lord.” 
The group will vary considerably in their experience of the
civil rights movement, due to their ages and geographic ori-
gins. Some will have participated; others will hardly know of
its existence. Members of the group proceed through the
museum at their own pace—sometimes in small groups, some-
times individually, sometimes conversing quietly and solemnly
at displays and, more often, reading or listening silently as
haunting events are portrayed and memories are jogged. Most
leave the museum to eat a meal with a colleague or friend,
some gather in small groups for conversation, and many retreat
to their rooms to contemplate the experience and its signifi-
cance in their lives and in the court system.
The following morning presents a time to leave that privacy
17. ROBERT COOPER & Q-METRICS, EQ MAP® INTERPRETATION GUIDE
(1997).
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and reflect publicly in an attempt to arrive at some shared
meaning about the events of the Civil Rights Movement, the
implications of those events, the lessons we have learned, the
state of race relations in our country, and the level of trust and
confidence in our system of justice in the United States. The
chairs are drawn in a tight circle with no tables to serve as bar-
riers between participants. As people enter the room the mood
is subdued—a contrast to the usual light banter. 
The experiential learning model is used as a guide for the
discussion. The leader requests simply that people talk about
what stood out for them as they moved through the museum.
One exhibit has meaning for one person; another exhibit
strikes a chord for another. Participants rarely stop with the
description of a display; they usually move on to share the feel-
ings and emotions that are evoked by the event portrayed. The
tone is respectful: this group has been together for four days,
and they have engaged in many activities that demanded intro-
spection and reflections on their lives. They have reached a
level of comfort with each other that is remarkable given the
fact that most of them knew no one outside their own state or
organization’s team when they arrived. Some struggle with
words to name and describe their feelings, evidence of the lack
of experience in doing this. The dialogue continues as other
participants identify what was learned and bring the problem
of racial inequities into the present. Finally, changes that need
to be made in the way we deal with each other are encouraged
in order to plan strategies and develop action plans for sensi-
tizing the court system to issues of diversity in our society.
Another group learning experience that is very powerful in
increasing emotional intelligence has been used in Maryland.
A judge was given the task of teaching a course to other judges
on the procedures for committing an individual to an elder
care facility. First, she visited such a facility and discussed her
upcoming program with the director. At his suggestion, she
read a book, The Notebook, by Nicholas Sparks, a slender novel
that deals with the aging process and the onset of Alzheimer’s
disease in a patient. She decided to invite all of her participants
to read the book prior to the class, and to hold the class at the
facility to give the judges a firsthand experience. 
Both the reading of the book and the visit to the facility
evoke emotions. Bringing those emotions into the discussion
along with a presentation of the procedural guidelines and the
legal issues involved provided a much richer learning experi-
ence than the simple presentation of cognitive content could
have done. The potential for developing self-awareness, empa-
thy, and the appropriate expression of emotions moved the
experience from an informative learning opportunity toward a
more transformative one. 
The final example comes from a training session conducted
by the Center for Effective Public Policy through a State Justice
Institute-funded project to promote collaboration in the crimi-
nal justice system. On the afternoon of the second day of a con-
ference for three drug court teams, the agenda indicated a ple-
nary session entitled “Introduction to Experiential Learning
Exercise.”  The teams were stunned by the appearance of a
“guest lecturer” in the person of Benjamin Franklin! He was
appropriately attired and presented the countenance and
demeanor that one would expect from Franklin. Without intro-
duction, he began to talk
about his role in the founding
of our nation and the degree
of collaboration that was
required to write the constitu-
tion and other documents. He
told of discussions and dis-
agreements with John Adams,
George Washington, and
Thomas Jefferson, and how
each one of them eventually
had to give up something in
order achieve their goal of a
new country. 
At the conclusion of his
talk, each team was given metro passes, a map of the national
Mall in Washington, and disposable cameras. Their assignment
was to keep the team together, negotiate the Metro system,
choose what spots on the Mall they would visit that demon-
strated collaborative efforts or heralded individuals who had
been instrumental in those efforts, choose a place to eat dinner
together, and return to the hotel. 
The following morning a facilitator led the group in an exer-
cise asking them to describe their experiences. Without
prompting, many participants mentioned their emotional
response to various parts of the exercise: intimidation by the
newness of the Metro system, frustration in deciding what sites
to visit—even where to eat! There was also recalling of emo-
tions regarding places like the Lincoln Memorial, the Vietnam
Memorial, the Supreme Court building, and the photography
exhibits at a Smithsonian building. The group was amazingly
open in naming and discussing their emotional reactions.
Bringing the discussion back to the principles of collaboration
that govern the operation of drug courts today, the group
moved on to discuss ways the experience could influence their
work. 
While the examples discussed above all involved formal
judicial education in a group, emotional intelligence can also
be developed by a single individual in a self-directed and infor-
mal learning situation using the experiential learning model.
Lucille was present in a small group of individuals working on
a project that involved an institution’s response to racial
inequality. The multiracial group chose to open the meeting by
having each person introduce himself or herself and by telling
about his or her interest in this program. Lucille, in describing
her experience, used the phrase, “those people” in reference to
African-Americans who had first integrated her school. While
there was no reaction from anyone in the group, Lucille was
uncomfortable with her choice of words. A couple of days
later, she mentioned it to two members of the group and
expressed her humiliation and her disappointment with her-
self. This self-awareness and ability to reflect on her remark
indicated a high level of emotional intelligence. Her willing-
ness to share her feelings about herself with others as she tried
to perceive how her words might have been received, and to
get feedback from her colleagues, enabled her to project and
plan what she would say and how she would present herself if
a similar situation arose again. This process of reflection and
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introspection is essential if one is to increase competence in
emotional intelligence and present oneself with authenticity
and integrity.
Judicial branch education can provide a vehicle through
which emotional literacy can be developed. It can give judges
and other court personnel an opportunity to “name the feel-
ing” in order to be more conscious of our affect and what 
drives our decisions and our behaviors.  Connecting what we
know and what we feel, we believe, will result in right action. 
CONCLUSION
Sartre said, “Hell is other people.” It would probably be best
for judges to stay away from the bench on days when they
agree with him! They can’t always do that, though, so learning
how to identify that feeling and manage it productively is
important. “The research suggests that a technically proficient
executive or professional with a high EQ is someone who picks
up—more readily, more deftly, and more quickly than others—
the budding conflicts that need resolution, the team and orga-
nizational vulnerabilities that need addressing, the gaps to be
leaped or filled, the hidden connections that spell opportunity,
and the murky, mysterious interactions that seem most likely
to prove golden—and profitable.”18
In our society, the court  system is quickly becoming a for-
mative institution, performing functions previously relegated
to home, family, religious institutions, and schools. Even the
healing community is making its way into the court system
with the advent of drug courts and other forms of therapeutic
jurisprudence.  A judge’s leadership skills are critical in man-
aging the changes in the system, the integrated relationships
that develop as well as the impact on their own work. Those
most successful will lead with their head and their heart. 
In Tahiti, there may not be a word for sadness. Nevertheless,
the emotion is there with all the attendant signs and behaviors.
What is missing is a language, a word that describes the feel-
ing causing the behavior associated with sadness. This kind of
literacy is important to develop here regarding emotional intel-
ligence, an awareness and a language for communicating the
connection between our cognitive brain and our affective
brain, our mind and our heart, and the result that kind of
learning can have on our work and our lives. 
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Just over a year ago, Court Review devoted a special issueto the topic of therapeutic jurisprudence (often called,simply, TJ).1 Judge William Schma, a leading judicial
voice in therapeutic jurisprudence, introduced the issue in an
essay titled “Judging for the New Millennium.”2
Judge Schma noted that “it is important for judges to prac-
tice TJ because—like it or not—the law does have therapeutic
and anti-therapeutic consequences.”3 In other words, judges
are increasingly recognizing that the choice is indeed either to
be part of the solution or, instead, to in essence be part of the
problem—of “revolving door” justice and the like.
In fact, in August 2000, the Conference of Chief Justices
and the Conference of State Court Administrators, in a joint
resolution, endorsed the notion of problem-solving courts and
calendars that utilize the principles of therapeutic jurispru-
dence.4 The resolution noted that well-functioning drug treat-
ment courts5 represent the best practice of these principles.
Regarding therapeutic jurisprudence specifically, the resolu-
tion states:
There are principles and methods founded in thera-
peutic jurisprudence, including integration of treat-
ment services with judicial case processing, ongoing
judicial intervention, close monitoring of and
immediate response to behavior, multi-disciplinary
involvement, and collaboration with community
based and government organizations.  These princi-
ples and methods are now being employed in these
newly arising courts and calendars, and they
advance the application of [other policy initiatives,
such as] the trial court performance standards and
the public trust and confidence initiative.6
Problem-solving courts—such as drug treatment courts,
mental health courts,7 and domestic violence courts8—may be
the most obvious examples of “therapeutic jurisprudence in
action,”9 but it is crucial to recognize the potential application
of therapeutic jurisprudence generally—in civil cases,10 appel-
late cases, 11 family law cases,12 and, of course, in criminal13 and
juvenile14cases.  The importance of the therapeutic jurispru-
dence perspective beyond the specialized problem-solving
court context was underscored by a “vision statement” recently
agreed to by the District Court for Clark County, Washington.15
CRIMINAL LAW CONTEXT
In the criminal law context, the challenge for therapeutic
jurisprudence is multifaceted, and includes a concern not only
for defendants, but also for others drawn into the process, such
as victims16 and jurors.17 The remainder of this essay, however,
will focus on defendants and on the opportunity for courts to
contribute to offender rehabilitation and reform.
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David B. Wexler
Robes and Rehabilitation:
How Judges Can Help Offenders “Make Good” 
Of course, judicial opportunity will be enhanced—but is by
no means dependent upon—the presence of a group of lawyers
practicing therapeutic jurisprudence.18 Such a bar is indeed
emerging.19
Dallas lawyer John McShane, for example, has a substantial
criminal law practice that “focuses solely on rehabilitation and
mitigation of punishment.”20 McShane is in private practice,
and he can pick and choose his clients.  He chooses only those
who agree to use the crisis occasioned by the criminal case as
an opportunity to turn their lives around.
McShane seeks to defer disposition so as to allow the client
an opportunity for rehabilitation.  The hope, of course, is that
the court will be impressed by, and take into account, such
post-offense rehabilitation efforts and gains.21
A packet of mitigating information is assembled and even-
tually submitted to the prosecutor in an effort at plea bargain-
ing, or, failing that, to the court at sentencing.  The packet con-
sists of items such as “AA Meeting Attendance Logs, urin-
analysis lab reports, reports of evaluating and treating mental
health professionals, and letters of support from various peo-
ple in the community, such as AA sponsor, employer, co-work-
ers, clergy, family, and friends.”22
This may be illustrative of the role of an excellent TJ defense
attorney, but what about the role of the judge?  Apart from the
important legal niceties such as the possibility of deferred sen-
tencing23 and the possibility of mitigating the sentence for
acceptance of responsibility24 and for post-offense rehabilita-
tion, what guidance can therapeutic jurisprudence give to
judges interested in furthering offender rehabilitation?
Some of the most exciting therapeutic jurisprudence work
involves the crafting of creative proposals for importing
promising behavioral science developments—such as impor-
tant research on rehabilitation—into the legal system and into
the day-to-day work of lawyers and judges.  Such work also
offers an excellent opportunity for partnership between acade-
mia and the judiciary.  
In other work, which I will only briefly summarize here, I
have explored how judges might use some basic principles to
increase offender compliance with conditions of
release.25Relatedly, I have explored how courts could encour-
age defendants to engage in relapse prevention planning.26
COMPLIANCE
The compliance project was inspired by a book titled
Facilitating Treatment Adherence: A Practitioner’s Guidebook.27
The book itself has nothing to do with law; it is addressed to
healthcare professionals and
deals with improving patient
adherence to medical advice.
But many of its principles
seem readily transferable to
a legal setting.
Some of the principles
are completely common
sensical, such as speaking in
simple terms.  Patients
sometimes may not comply
with medical advice because
they never really quite get the message.
Other principles are somewhat less obvious.  For instance,
when patients sign “behavioral contracts”—agreeing to follow
certain medical protocols, for example—they are apparently
more likely to comply with medical advice than if such a con-
tract is not entered into.  If patients make some sort of public
commitment to comply, to persons above and beyond the
health care provider, their compliance is likely to increase.
Relatedly, if family members are aware of a patient’s promise,
the patient is again more likely to adhere to the agreed-upon
conditions.
Consider how these compliance principles might operate in
a legal context.  If a judge is considering a petition for the con-
ditional release of an insanity-acquitted offender, or if, at a sen-
tencing hearing, a judge is deciding whether to grant proba-
tion, the court could conceptualize the conditional release not
simply as a judicial order but as a type of behavioral contract.
In addition, the hearing can serve as a forum in which an
insanity acquittee or criminal defendant can make a public
commitment to comply.  Compliance should also be enhanced
by the presence at the hearing of agreed-upon family members.
There is much more to this, of course, and the interested reader
can consult the more detailed work.28 Let us now turn to the
related material on relapse prevention planning principles.  
RELAPSE PREVENTION
As with the compliance project, my interest in importing
relapse prevention planning into the legal arena was triggered
by a particular book, this time James McGuire’s anthology titled
What Works: Reducing Reoffending.29 The gist of McGuire’s book
is that certain rehabilitation techniques, known as the “cogni-
tive behavioral” variety, seem particularly promising.
These programs are premised on the fact that offenders
often act rather impulsively.  Accordingly, the programs are
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geared to teaching offenders
certain problem-solving
skills: to understand the
chain of events that often
leads to criminality, to antic-
ipate high-risk situations,
and to learn to stop and
think so as to avoid high-
risk situations or to ade-
quately cope with such situ-
ations should they arise.  
Once offenders develop
such an understanding,
they may prepare relapse
prevention plans.  For example, “I realize that I am at highest
risk for criminal behavior when I party with Joe on Friday
nights. I will therefore stay home and rent a video on Friday
nights.”
An interesting therapeutic jurisprudence inquiry is to
explore how courts can encourage this “cognitive/behavioral”
rehabilitative effort as part of the legal process itself.  My sug-
gestion—again, developed more fully elsewhere30—is for the
court to place some real responsibility on the defendant (with
the assistance of counsel and others) to think through his or
her situation and vulnerabilities.
Thus, a judge about to consider a defendant for probation
might say, “I’m going to consider you but I want you to come
up with a type of preliminary plan that we will use as a basis
of discussion.  I want you to figure out why I should grant you
probation and why I should feel comfortable that you’re going
to succeed.  In order for me to feel comfortable, I need to know
what you regard to be high-risk situations and how you’re
going to avoid them or cope with them without messing up.
And, speaking of messing up, I want you to tell me what hap-
pened that led you to mess up last time, and why you think the
situation is different this time around.”
Under such an approach, a court would be promoting cog-
nitive self-change as part and parcel of the sentencing process
itself.  The process might operate this way: “I realize I mess up
on Friday nights, and from now on I will stay home on
Fridays.”
Note that this condition is not the product of judicial fiat.
Instead, the defendant has thought through a serious high-risk
situation and has in essence come up with his or her own con-
dition of probation.  The offender is thus likely to regard the
condition as fair and, linking back to our earlier discussion, is
probably more likely to comply with it than if it had simply
been externally imposed by the court.
According to the “what works” research, cognitive self-
change programs seem promising, but, of course, they do not
work for everyone.  If an offender is committed to continued
offending, for example, even substantial exposure to a program
of problem-solving skills is simply not going to lead to desis-
tance.
On the other hand, if an offender has a self-concept of being
a basically good person who often finds himself in a jam, or in
the wrong place at the wrong time, or mixing with the wrong
crowd, such a person may well decide he wants to straighten
out and take control of his life.  For such a person, a cognitive
skills development program may well help change his course.
DESISTANCE
Who decides to change course, and how and why, seem to be
questions locked away in what Shadd Maruna calls the “black
box”31 of the “what works” literature.  Maruna’s book, Making
Good: How Ex-Convicts Reform and Rebuild Their Lives,32 pub-
lished in 2001 by the American Psychological Association, is,
like Facilitating Treatment Adherence33 and What Works,34 a
meaty work chock full of therapeutic jurisprudential implica-
tions.  In the remainder of this essay, I would like to explore
how Maruna’s findings might be relevant to judges—how, with
these insights, judges might help offenders “make good.”
Briefly, in his “Liverpool Desistance Study,”  Maruna inter-
viewed both “persistent” offenders and those who, after a
steady diet of criminal behavior, eventually become “desisters.”
His objective was to use a “narrative” approach—consistent
with the notion of “narrative therapy”35—to see how the two
offender types described and made sense of their lives.
Maruna’s principal contribution, of course, relates to the
“desisters.”  These ex-convicts need to develop a “coherent,
prosocial identity,”36 and need an explanation for “how their
checkered past could have led to their new, reformed identi-
ties.”37 Presumably, these explanatory narratives are not
merely a result of desistance behavior, but should also be
understood as “factors that help to sustain desistance.”38
Maruna notes that there is much drifting and zigzagging in
and out of criminal activity.39 Accordingly, desistance is best
seen as a “maintenance process,”40 rather than as a specific
event.
Generally, a desister’s narrative establishes that the narra-
tor’s “real self” is basically good; that the narrator became a vic-
tim of society who turned to crime and drugs to cope with a
bleak environment; that the narrator then became trapped in a
vicious cycle of repeated criminal activity and imprisonment;
that someone in conventional society believed in and recog-
nized the potential of the narrator, thereby allowing him or her
to make good.41
But “reformation is not something that is visible or objective
My suggestion . . .
is for the court to
place some real
responsibility on
the defendant . . .
to think through
his or her 
situation and 
vulnerabilities.
20 Court Review - Spring 2001
in the sense it can be ‘proven.’”42 It is a construct that is inter-
actional in nature: desisting persons must in some way accept
conventional society and conventional society must in turn
accept them.43 Thus, their conversion “may remain suspect to
significant others, and most importantly to themselves.”44
Accordingly, the desisting interviewees in Maruna’s study
“seemed almost obsessed with establishing the authenticity of
their reform.”45 During the interviews, many provided sup-
porting documents—letters from college teachers and from
parole officers, copies of offense records showing the date of
last conviction.  Others urged the investigator to speak with
family members, girlfriends, or to the manager or receptionist
of a drug treatment clinic.46
Not surprisingly, “while the testimony of any conventional
other will do, the best certification of reform involves a public
or official endorsement from media outlets, community lead-
ers, and members of the social control establishment.”47 In his
final chapter, Maruna undertakes an exercise that is essentially
a therapeutic jurisprudential one: he speaks of instituting and
institutionalizing redemption rituals.  These include gradua-
tion ceremonies upon successful completion of correctional
programs,48 reentry courts “empowered not only to reimprison
each felon but also to officially recognize their efforts toward
reform,”49 and “rebiographing” clean ex-offenders through
officially recognized record expungement procedures.50
HOW COURTS CAN HELP
Two judicially related proposals mentioned by Maruna—
graduation ceremonies and reentry courts—are matters of con-
siderable current interest.
In drug treatment courts, for example, applause is common,
and, in some courts, even judicial hugs are by no means a rare
occurrence.51 In Judge Judy Mitchell-Davis’s Chicago court-
room, “upon successful completion of a drug court sentence,
the offenders invite their friends and family to a graduation
ceremony in the courthouse.”52 Some of the graduates make
speeches, and all receive a “diploma” from the court.53 In some
such courts, “participants have asked that their arresting offi-
cer be present at their graduation.”54
These lessons from drug treatment courts can be extended,
of course, to other specialized treatment courts and to ordinary
juvenile and criminal cases.  Judicial praise, family and friend
attendance, and gradua-
tion ceremonies can all
occur, for example, at the
successful completion of—
or early termination of—a
period of probation
imposed in a “routine”
criminal case.
Such a ceremony would
acknowledge a former
offender’s progress and,
taking a page from
Maruna, may, at the same
time, itself contribute to the
maintenance of desisting
behavior.  The strong suggestion that these ceremonies are
themselves therapeutic, and are therefore not merely “ceremo-
nial,” might readily justify their widespread use.  Relatedly, if
they seem themselves to contribute to reduced recidivism, that
crucially important societal benefit could easily justify their
time-consuming nature.
Besides graduation ceremonies, Maruna endorses the notion
of reentry courts “empowered not only to reimprison each felon
but also to officially recognize their efforts toward reform.”55
The apparent success of drug treatment courts, based on a team
approach and ongoing judge-defendant interaction, has led to
proposals for importing the model to the prisoner reentry
process.56
Reentry courts could tap many principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence, and could serve a very important function.  The
problem, however, is that, at least in the United States, “in
most jurisdictions, the authority for reentry issues is not
within the judicial branch.”57
Nonetheless, the function Maruna would like to see
served—official recognition of efforts toward reform—can be
performed by courts in at least some contexts.  For example,
unlike adult criminal courts, juvenile courts do typically retain
a post-dispositional review authority, and such courts can in
effect serve a major reentry function.58
The main lesson, of course, is that review hearings—for
juveniles, for probationers, for conditionally released insanity
acquittees—need not only be meaningful if one is to be “vio-
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lated” and there is a real threat
of revocation.  Such hearings
can and should also be mean-
ingful—and not just routine
and perfunctory—when all is
going well.  In many legal set-
tings, courts have the discre-
tion to set review hearings at
intervals shorter than those
mandated by law.  Judges
should consider taking such
action even when they are not
especially worried about an offender’s compliance, for such a
hearing could indeed recognize and applaud an offender’s
efforts and itself contribute to the maintenance of desistance.
Recall that desistance is best thought of as a “maintenance
process.”59 And recall that desisters—especially at the early
stages of desistance—desperately need outside validation to
convince themselves of their conversion.
The judge, of course, is the perfect prestigious person to
confer public and official validation on the offender and the
offender’s reform efforts.  Ideally, at a deferred sentencing hear-
ing or at an “all is going well” review hearing, the judge also
can comment favorably upon the sorts of matters that Maruna
found to be so important to desisting offenders: impressive
meeting attendance logs, for example, and letters from or the
occasional live testimony of members of conventional society:
college teacher, probation or parole officer, mother, girlfriend,
manager and receptionist at the drug clinic, and the like.
When all goes well, of course, it is relatively easy for the
judge to constitute the respected member of conventional soci-
ety willing to “believe in”60 the defendant and to see the defen-
dant’s “real me”61—the diamond in the rough.62 But all does
not always go well.  Review hearings will often be rather
“mixed,” and sometimes they will require revocation.
Sentencing hearings will not invariably lead to probationary
dispositions.  Often, judicial discretion regarding disposition
will be severely circumscribed.
Even in these far from favorable situations, the court can
play a highly important—albeit a more long-range—role in
potential offender reform.  Consider the “vision statement” of
the District Court of Clark County, Washington.63 That vision
specifically embraces the use of principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence to “make a positive change in the lives of people
who come before the court.”64
Some of the vision statement’s “guiding values” relate
remarkably well to Maruna’s findings regarding desister narra-
tives.  One guiding value, for example, is that “individuals are
not condemned to a life of crime or despair by mental condi-
tion or substance abuse and that everyone can achieve a ful-
filling and responsible life.”65 Another is the belief that “every-
one, no matter whom, has something positive within their
make up that can be built upon.”66
A judge committed to this vision will not regard these guid-
ing values as mere fluff.  Such a judge, for example, is unlikely
to tell a woman that she is simply “no good as a mother.”67
And, even when imposing a severe sentence, such a judge is
not going to say, “You are a menace and a danger to society.
Society should be protected from the likes of you.”68
Instead, especially in light of Maruna’s findings, a judge
committed to the vision statement should search for and com-
ment on whatever favorable features might eventually be
woven together by the offender to constitute the “real me” or
the “diamond in the rough.”  Sometimes, such a favorable fea-
ture might mitigate the sentence.  If the judge takes the pains
to emphasize it as a real quality—not simply as a mechanical
mitigating factor—it may eventually constitute a meaningful
component of the offender’s self-identify.  Such a judge might
say something like this:
You and your friends were involved in some pretty
serious business here, and I am going to impose a
sentence that reflects just how serious it is.  I want
to add one thing, however.  There’s been some testi-
mony here about how you showed some real con-
cern for the victim.  I’m going to take that into con-
sideration in your case.  You know, according to
some of the letters that were submitted, it looks like
that sensitive nature is something you displayed
way back in grade school   Nowadays, it seems to
peek out only now and then.  But if I could peel
away a few layers, I’ll bet I could get a glimpse of a
pretty caring person way down there.  In any case,
under the law in this state, I’m able to reduce your
sentence by a year for what you did when that car-
ing quality came peeking out last March.
Sometimes, a search for and discovery of a favorable feature
or quality may not influence the disposition at all, but it may
nonetheless plant a helpful seed, like this:
I don’t really know what went wrong here.  I do
know you committed a robbery and someone was
hurt.  And I know that it is only right that I impose
a sentence of such-and-such. What I don’t under-
stand is why this all happened.  You are obviously
very intelligent and were always a good student.
Your former wife says that, until a few years ago,
you were a very good, caring, and responsible
father.  You obviously have a real talent for wood-
working, but it’s been years since you spent time on
a real woodworking project.  Beneath all this, I see a
good person who has gotten on the wrong path.  I
hope you’ll think about this and change that path.
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With your intelligence, personality, and talent, I
think you can do it if you decide you really want to.
CONCLUSION
Even if the sentence imposed is unaffected, following this
process is likely to be worth the judicial effort.  Maruna notes
that both narrative development and desistance each constitute
ongoing processes.  In rewriting the narratives of their lives,
desisting offenders often look to instances in their pasts when
their “real” selves shone and when respected members of con-
ventional society recognized their talents and good qualities.
Thus, even in instances where desistance seems not to have
occurred, judges can use principles of therapeutic jurispru-
dence in the hope that their judicial behavior may constitute
the building blocks of eventual reform and rehabilitation.  This
sort of judging may therefore have both short-term and long-
term benefits.  Ultimately, the benefits may be for offenders,
and, in turn, for society as a whole.
And let’s not forget the benefits to the judges, whose sense
of professional satisfaction may soar.69 Who would not feel
immense satisfaction receiving letters, as Chicago drug treat-
ment court Judge Judy Mitchell-Davis (dubbed “Judge Judy”
by defendants) often does, like this one?:
Judge Judy, I just want to thank you for being the
loving and caring woman that you are.  You’ve really
helped make a positive change in my life.  I believe
I’m going to make it.  It feels so amazing to control
my own thoughts and feelings.  I feel so good about
myself for the first time.70
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In the Winter 2001 Court Review, we
reprinted excerpts of the appellate briefs in
U.S. v. Microsoft concerning the trial judge’s
media interviews about the case.  On June
28, 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit unanimously concluded that the
judge’s conduct was improper.  As we sug-
gested in the preceding issue, while the
Microsoft case may be unique, the incidence
of judges having at least some contact with
reporters is not.  Thus, we believe the court’s
decision in the Microsoft case on this issue
will be of widespread interest.  The citations
to the judge’s media interviews, have been
omitted; citations to those interviews can be
found in the briefs excerpted in the Winter
2001 issue.  In our next issue, William G.
Ross, a law professor at the Cumberland
School of Law at Samford University in
Birmingham, Alabama, whose article on
extrajudicial speech was cited by the
Microsoft court, will provide some overall
guidance for judges on dealing with both the
ethical rules discussed here and the media.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee v. 
MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
Appellant.
No. 00-5212, 
Consolidated with 00-5213
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
Argued: February 27, 2001
Decided: June 28, 2001
Reported at: 253 F. 3d 34.
Per Curiam: Microsoft Corporation
appeals from judgments of the District
Court finding the company in violation of
§§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and order-
ing various remedies.   .   .   .   .
[253 F.3d at 107]  
VI. JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
Canon 3A(6) of the Code of Conduct
for United States Judges requires federal
judges to “avoid public comment on the
merits of [] pending or impending” cases.
Canon 2 tells judges to “avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities,” on the bench and off. Canon
3A(4) forbids judges to initiate or consider
ex parte communications on the merits of
pending or impending proceedings.
Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code
requires judges to recuse themselves when
their “impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
All indications are that the District
Judge violated each of these ethical pre-
cepts by talking about the case with
reporters. The violations were deliberate,
repeated, egregious, and flagrant. The only
serious question is what consequences
should follow. Microsoft urges us to dis-
qualify the District Judge, vacate the judg-
ment in its entirety and toss out the find-
ings of fact, and remand for a new trial
before a different District Judge. At the
other extreme, plaintiffs ask us to do noth-
ing. We agree with neither position.
A. The District Judge’s Communications
with the Press
Immediately after the District Judge
entered final judgment on June 7, 2000,
accounts of interviews with him began
appearing in the press. Some of the inter-
views were held after he entered final
judgment. The District Judge also aired his
views about the case to larger audiences,
giving [253 F.3d at 108] speeches at a col-
lege and at an antitrust seminar.
From the published accounts, it is
apparent that the Judge also had been giv-
ing secret interviews to select reporters
before entering final judgment—in some
instances long before. The earliest inter-
views we know of began in September
1999, shortly after the parties finished pre-
senting evidence but two months before
the court issued its Findings of Fact.
Interviews with reporters from the New
York Times and Ken Auletta, another
reporter who later wrote a book on the
Microsoft case, continued throughout late
1999 and the first half of 2000, during
which time the Judge issued his Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final
Judgment. The Judge “embargoed” these
interviews; that is, he insisted that the fact
and content of the interviews remain
secret until he issued the Final Judgment.
Before we recount the statements
attributed to the District Judge, we need to
say a few words about the state of the
record. All we have are the published
accounts and what the reporters say the
Judge said. Those accounts were not
admitted in evidence. They may be
hearsay.
We are of course concerned about
granting a request to disqualify a federal
judge when the material supporting it has
not been admitted in evidence.
Disqualification is never taken lightly. In
the wrong hands, a disqualification
motion is a procedural weapon to harass
opponents and delay proceedings. If sup-
ported only by rumor, speculation, or
innuendo, it is also a means to tarnish the
reputation of a federal judge.
But the circumstances of this case are
most unusual. By placing an embargo on
the interviews, the District Judge ensured
that the full extent of his actions would
not be revealed until this case was on
appeal. Plaintiffs, in defending the judg-
ment, do not dispute the statements attrib-
uted to him in the press; they do not
request an evidentiary hearing; and they
do not argue that Microsoft should have
filed a motion in the District Court before
raising the matter on appeal. At oral argu-
ment, plaintiffs all but conceded that the
Judge violated ethical restrictions by dis-
cussing the case in public: “On behalf of
the governments, I have no brief to defend
the District Judge’s decision to discuss this
case publicly while it was pending on
appeal, and I have no brief to defend the
judge’s decision to discuss the case with
reporters while the trial was proceeding,
even given the embargo on any reporting
concerning those conversations until after
the trial.” 02/27/01 Ct. Appeals Tr. at 326.
We must consider too that the federal
disqualification provisions reflect a strong
federal policy to preserve the actual and
apparent impartiality of the federal judi-
ciary. Judicial misconduct may implicate
that policy regardless of the means by
which it is disclosed to the public. [253
F.3d at 109]  Also, in our analysis of the
The Resource Page: Focus on U.S. v. Microsoft
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arguments presented by the parties, the
specifics of particular conversations are
less important than their cumulative
effect.
For these reasons we have decided to
adjudicate Microsoft’s disqualification
request notwithstanding the state of the
record. The same reasons also warrant a
departure from our usual practice of
declining to address issues raised for the
first time on appeal . . . .   We will assume
the truth of the press accounts and not
send the case back for an evidentiary hear-
ing on this subject. We reach no judgment
on whether the details of the interviews
were accurately recounted.
The published accounts indicate that
the District Judge discussed numerous
topics relating to the case. Among them
was his distaste for the defense of techno-
logical integration—one of the central
issues in the lawsuit. In September 1999,
two months before his Findings of Fact
and six months before his Conclusions of
Law, and in remarks that were kept secret
until after the Final Judgment, the Judge
told reporters from the New York Times
that he questioned Microsoft’s integration
of a web browser into Windows. Stating
that he was “not a fan of integration,” he
drew an analogy to a 35-millimeter camera
with an integrated light meter that in his
view should also be offered separately:
“You like the convenience of having a light
meter built in, integrated, so all you have
to do is press a button to get a reading. But
do you think camera makers should also
serve photographers who want to use a
separate light meter, so they can hold it
up, move it around?”  In other remarks,
the Judge commented on the integration
at the heart of the case: “It was quite clear
to me that the motive of Microsoft in
bundling the Internet browser was not one
of consumer convenience. The evidence
that this was done for the consumer was
not credible . . . .   The evidence was so
compelling that there was an ulterior
motive.”  As for tying law in general, he
criticized this court’s ruling in the consent
decree case, saying it “was wrongheaded
on several counts” and would exempt the
software industry from the antitrust laws. 
Reports of the interviews have the
District Judge describing Microsoft’s con-
duct, with particular emphasis on what he
regarded as the company’s prevarication,
hubris, and impenitence. In some of his
secret meetings with reporters, the Judge
offered his contemporaneous impressions
of testimony. He permitted at least one
reporter to see an entry concerning Bill
Gates in his “oversized green notebook.”
He also provided numerous after-the-fact
credibility assessments. He told reporters
that Bill Gates’ “testimony is inherently
without credibility” and “if you can’t
believe this guy, who else can you
believe?” As for the company’s other wit-
nesses, the Judge is reported as saying that
there [253 F.3d at 110] “were times when
I became impatient with Microsoft wit-
nesses who were giving speeches.” “They
were telling me things I just flatly could
not credit.” In an interview given the day
he entered the break-up order, he summed
things up: “Falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus”: “Untrue in one thing, untrue in
everything.” “I don’t subscribe to that as
absolutely true. But it does lead one to sus-
picion. It’s a universal human experience.
If someone lies to you once, how much
else can you credit as the truth?”
According to reporter Auletta, the
District Judge told him in private that, “I
thought they [Microsoft and its execu-
tives] didn’t think they were regarded as
adult members of the community. I
thought they would learn.” The Judge told
a college audience that “Bill Gates is an
ingenious engineer, but I don’t think he is
that adept at business ethics. He has not
yet come to realise things he did (when
Microsoft was smaller) he should not have
done when he became a monopoly.”
Characterizing Gates’ and his company’s
“crime” as hubris, the Judge stated that “if
I were able to propose a remedy of my
devising, I’d require Mr. Gates to write a
book report” on Napoleon Bonaparte,
“because I think [Gates] has a Napoleonic
concept of himself and his company, an
arrogance that derives from power and
unalloyed success, with no leavening hard
experience, no reverses.”  The Judge
apparently became, in Auletta’s words,
“increasingly troubled by what he learned
about Bill Gates and couldn’t get out of his
mind the group picture he had seen of Bill
Gates and Paul Allen and their shaggy-
haired first employees at Microsoft.” The
reporter wrote that the Judge said he saw
in the picture “a smart-mouthed young
kid who has extraordinary ability and
needs a little discipline. I’ve often said to
colleagues that Gates would be better off if
he had finished Harvard.”
The District Judge likened Microsoft’s
writing of incriminating documents to
drug traffickers who “never figure out that
they shouldn’t be saying certain things on
the phone.” He invoked the drug trafficker
analogy again to denounce Microsoft’s
protestations of innocence, this time with
a reference to the notorious Newton Street
Crew that terrorized parts of Washington,
D.C.  Reporter Auletta wrote in The New
Yorker that the Judge 
went as far as to compare the
company’s declaration of inno-
cence to the protestations of
gangland killers. He was refer-
ring to five gang members in a
racketeering, drug-dealing, and
murder trial that he had presided
over four years earlier. In that
case, the three victims had had
their heads bound with duct tape
before they were riddled with
bullets from semi-automatic
weapons. “On the day of the sen-
tencing, the gang members main-
tained that they had done noth-
ing wrong, saying that the whole
case was a conspiracy by the
white power structure to destroy
them,” Jackson recalled. “I am
now under no illusions that mis-
creants will realize that other
parts of society will view them
that way.”
[253 F.3d at 111] The District Judge
also secretly divulged to reporters his
views on the remedy for Microsoft’s
antitrust violations. On the question
whether Microsoft was entitled to any
process at the remedy stage, the Judge told
reporters in May 2000 that he was “not
aware of any case authority that says I
have to give them any due process at all.
The case is over. They lost.”  Another
reporter has the Judge asking “were the
Japanese allowed to propose terms of their
surrender?” The District Judge also told
reporters the month before he issued his
break-up order that “[a]ssuming, as I
think they are, [] the Justice Department
and the states are genuinely concerned
about the public interest,” “I know they
have carefully studied all the possible
options. This isn’t a bunch of amateurs.
They have consulted with some of the best
minds in America over a long period of
time.” “I am not in a position to duplicate
that and re-engineer their work. There’s no
way I can equip myself to do a better job
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than they have done.”
In February 2000, four months before
his final order splitting the company in
two, the District Judge reportedly told
New York Times reporters that he was “not
at all comfortable with restructuring the
company” because he was unsure
whether he was “competent to do that.”
A few months later, he had a change of
heart. He told the same reporters that
“with what looks like Microsoft intransi-
gence, a breakup is inevitable.” The Judge
recited a “North Carolina mule trainer”
story to explain his change in thinking
from “if it ain’t broken, don’t try to fix it”
and “I just don’t think that [restructuring
the company] is something I want to try
to do on my own” to ordering Microsoft
broken in two:
He had a trained mule who could
do all kinds of wonderful tricks.
One day somebody asked him:
“How do you do it? How do you
train the mule to do all these
amazing things?” “Well,” he
answered, “I’ll show you.” He
took a 2-by-4 and whopped him
upside the head.  The mule was
reeling and fell to his knees, and
the trainer said: “You just have to
get his attention.”
The Judge added: “I hope I’ve got
Microsoft’s attention.” 
B. Violations of the Code of Conduct for
United States Judges
The Code of Conduct for United States
Judges was adopted by the Judicial
Conference of the United States in 1973. It
prescribes ethical norms for federal judges
as a means to preserve the actual and
apparent integrity of the federal judiciary.
Every federal judge receives a copy of the
Code, the Commentary to the Code, the
Advisory Opinions of the Judicial
Conference’s Committee on Codes of
Conduct, and digests of the Committee’s
informal, unpublished opinions. See II
GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES (1973). The material is
periodically updated. Judges who have
questions about whether their conduct
would be consistent with the [253 F.3d at
112]  Code may write to the Codes of
Conduct Committee for a written, confi-
dential opinion. See Introduction, CODE OF
CONDUCT. The Committee traditionally
responds promptly. A judge may also seek
informal advice from the Committee’s cir-
cuit representative.
While some of the Code’s Canons fre-
quently generate questions about their
application, others are straightforward
and easily understood. Canon 3A(6) is an
example of the latter. In forbidding fed-
eral judges to comment publicly “on the
merits of a pending or impending action,”
Canon 3A(6) applies to cases pending
before any court, state or federal, trial or
appellate. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL.,
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 10.34, at
353 (3d ed. 2000). As “impending” indi-
cates, the prohibition begins even before a
case enters the court system, when there
is reason to believe a case may be filed. Cf.
E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 54 (1973). An
action remains “pending” until “comple-
tion of the appellate process.” CODE OF
CONDUCT Canon 3A(6) cmt.; Comm. on
Codes of Conduct, Adv. Op. No. 55
(1998).
The Microsoft case was “pending” dur-
ing every one of the District Judge’s meet-
ings with reporters; the case is “pending”
now; and even after our decision issues, it
will remain pending for some time. The
District Judge breached his ethical duty
under Canon 3A(6) each time he spoke to
a reporter about the merits of the case.
Although the reporters interviewed him
in private, his comments were public.
Court was not in session and his discus-
sion of the case took place outside the
presence of the parties. He provided his
views not to court personnel assisting him
in the case, but to members of the public.
And these were not just any members of
the public. Because he was talking to
reporters, the Judge knew his comments
would eventually receive widespread dis-
semination.
It is clear that the District Judge was
not discussing purely procedural matters,
which are a permissible subject of public
comment under one of the Canon’s three
narrowly drawn exceptions. He disclosed
his views on the factual and legal matters
at the heart of the case. His opinions
about the credibility of witnesses, the
validity of legal theories, the culpability of
the defendant, the choice of remedy, and
so forth all dealt with the merits of the
action. It is no excuse that the Judge may
have intended to “educate” the public
about the case or to rebut “public misper-
ceptions” purportedly caused by the par-
ties.  If those were his intentions, he could
have addressed the factual and legal issues
as he saw them—and thought the public
should see them—in his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Final Judgment, or in
a written opinion. Or he could have held
his tongue until all appeals were con-
cluded.
Far from mitigating his conduct, the
District Judge’s insistence on secrecy—his
embargo—made matters worse. Conceal-
ment of the interviews suggests knowl-
edge of their impropriety. Concealment
also prevented the parties from nipping
his improprieties in the bud. Without any
knowledge of the interviews, neither the
plaintiffs nor the defendant had a chance
to object or to seek the Judge’s removal
before he issued his Final Judgment.
Other federal judges have been dis-
qualified for making limited public com-
ments about cases pending before them.
See In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d
164 (1st Cir. 2001); In re IBM Corp., 45 F.3d
641 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Cooley,
1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993). Given the [253
F.3d at 113] extent of the Judge’s trans-
gressions in this case, we have little doubt
that if the parties had discovered his
secret liaisons with the press, he would
have been disqualified, voluntarily or by
court order. Cf. In re Barry, 292 U.S. App.
D.C. 39, 946 F.2d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(per curiam); 946 F.2d at 915 (Edwards,
J., dissenting).
In addition to violating the rule pro-
hibiting public comment, the District
Judge’s reported conduct raises serious
questions under Canon 3A(4). That
Canon states that a “judge should accord
to every person who is legally interested
in a proceeding, or the person’s lawyer,
full right to be heard according to law,
and, except as authorized by law, neither
initiate nor consider ex parte communica-
tions on the merits, or procedures affect-
ing the merits, of a pending or impending
proceeding.”  CODE OF CONDUCT Canon
3A(4).
What did the reporters convey to the
District Judge during their secret sessions?
By one account, the Judge spent a total of
ten hours giving taped interviews to one
reporter. We do not know whether he
spent even more time in untaped conver-
sations with the same reporter, nor do we
know how much time he spent with oth-
ers. But we think it safe to assume that
these interviews were not monologues.
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Interviews often become conversations.
When reporters pose questions or make
assertions, they may be furnishing infor-
mation, information that may reflect their
personal views of the case. The published
accounts indicate this happened on at
least one occasion. Ken Auletta reported,
for example, that he told the Judge “that
Microsoft employees professed shock that
he thought they had violated the law and
behaved unethically,” at which time the
Judge became “agitated” by “Microsoft’s
‘obstinacy’.”  It is clear that Auletta had
views of the case. As he wrote in a
Washington Post editorial, “anyone who sat
in [the District Judge’s] courtroom during
the trial had seen ample evidence of
Microsoft’s sometimes thuggish tactics.” 
The District Judge’s repeated violations
of Canons 3A(6) and 3A(4) also violated
Canon 2, which provides that “a judge
should avoid impropriety and the appear-
ance of impropriety in all activities.”
CODE OF CONDUCT Canon 2; see also In re
Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 47 F.3d 399,
400 (10th Cir. Jud. Council 1995)(“The
allegations of extra-judicial comments
cause the Council substantial concern
under both Canon 3A(6) and Canon 2 of
the Judicial Code of Conduct.”). Canon
2A requires federal judges to “respect and
comply with the law” and to “act at all
times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartial-
ity of the judiciary.”  CODE OF CONDUCT
Canon 2A. The Code of Conduct is the
law with respect to the ethical obligations
of federal judges, and it is clear the
District Judge violated it on multiple
occasions in this case. The rampant disre-
gard for the judiciary’s ethical obligations
that the public witnessed in this case
undoubtedly jeopardizes “public confi-
dence in the integrity” of the District
Court proceedings.
Another point needs to be stressed.
Rulings in this case have potentially huge
financial consequences for one of the
nation’s largest publicly-traded companies
and its investors. The District Judge’s
secret interviews during the trial provided
a select few with inside information about
the case, information that enabled them
and anyone they shared it with to antici-
pate rulings before the Judge announced
them to the world. Although he “embar-
goed” his comments, the Judge had no
way of policing the reporters. For all he
knew there may have been trading on the
basis [253 F.3d at 114] of the information
he secretly conveyed. The public cannot
be expected to maintain confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the federal
judiciary in the face of such conduct.
C. Appearance of Partiality
The Code of Conduct contains no
enforcement mechanism. See THODE,
REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT 43.  The Canons, including the
one that requires a judge to disqualify
himself in certain circumstances, see CODE
OF CONDUCT Canon 3C, are self- enforcing.
There are, however, remedies extrinsic to
the Code. One is an internal disciplinary
proceeding, begun with the filing of a
complaint with the clerk of the court of
appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(c).
Another is disqualification of the offend-
ing judge under either 28 U.S.C. § 144,
which requires the filing of an affidavit
while the case is in the District Court, or
28 U.S.C. § 455, which does not.
Microsoft urges the District Judge’s dis-
qualification under § 455(a): a judge
“shall disqualify himself in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The
standard for disqualification under §
455(a) is an objective one. The question is
whether a reasonable and informed
observer would question the judge’s
impartiality. See In re Barry, 946 F.2d at
914; see also In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194,
201 (2d Cir. 2001); RICHARD E. FLAMM,
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION § 24.2.1 (1996).
“The very purpose of § 455(a) is to
promote confidence in the judiciary by
avoiding even the appearance of impro-
priety whenever possible.” Liljeberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.
847, 865 (1988).  As such, violations of
the Code of Conduct may give rise to a
violation of § 455(a) if doubt is cast on
the integrity of the judicial process. It has
been argued that any “public comment by
a judge concerning the facts, applicable
law, or merits of a case that is sub judice in
his court or any comment concerning the
parties or their attorneys would raise
grave doubts about the judge’s objectivity
and his willingness to reserve judgment
until the close of the proceeding.”
William G. Ross, Extrajudicial Speech:
Charting the Boundaries of Propriety, 2
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 598 (1989). Some
courts of appeals have taken a hard line
on public comments, finding violations of
§ 455(a) for judicial commentary on
pending cases that seems mild in compar-
ison to what we are confronting in this
case. See Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d
164 (granting writ of mandamus ordering
district judge to recuse herself under §
455(a) because of public comments on
class certification and standing in a pend-
ing case); In re IBM Corp., 45 F.3d 641
(granting writ of mandamus ordering dis-
trict judge to recuse himself based in part
on the appearance of partiality caused by
his giving newspaper interviews); Cooley,
1 F.3d 985 (vacating convictions and dis-
qualifying district judge for appearance of
partiality because he appeared on televi-
sion program Nightline and stated that
abortion protestors in a case before him
were breaking the law and that his injunc-
tion would be obeyed).
While § 455(a) is concerned with
actual and apparent impropriety, the
statute requires disqualification only
when a judge’s “impartiality might reason-
ably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
Although this court has condemned pub-
lic judicial comments on pending cases,
we have not gone so far as to hold that
every violation of Canon 3A(6) or every
impropriety under the Code of Conduct
inevitably destroys the appearance of
impartiality and thus violates § 455(a).
See In re Barry, 946 F.2d at 914; see also
Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d at 168;
United States v. [253 F.3d at 115] Fortier,
242 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir. 2001). 
In this case, however, we believe the
line has been crossed. The public com-
ments were not only improper, but also
would lead a reasonable, informed
observer to question the District Judge’s
impartiality. Public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary
is seriously jeopardized when judges
secretly share their thoughts about the
merits of pending cases with the press.
Judges who covet publicity, or convey the
appearance that they do, lead any objec-
tive observer to wonder whether their
judgments are being influenced by the
prospect of favorable coverage in the
media. Discreet and limited public com-
ments may not compromise a judge’s
apparent impartiality, but we have little
doubt that the District Judge’s conduct
had that effect. Appearance may be all
there is, but that is enough to invoke the
Canons and § 455(a).
Judge Learned Hand spoke of “this
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America of ours where the passion for
publicity is a disease, and where swarms
of foolish, tawdry moths dash with rap-
ture into its consuming fire . . . .” LEARNED
HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 132-33 (2d
ed. 1953). Judges are obligated to resist
this passion. Indulging it compromises
what Edmund Burke justly regarded as
the “cold neutrality of an impartial
judge.” Cold or not, federal judges must
maintain the appearance of impartiality.
What was true two centuries ago is true
today: “Deference to the judgments and
rulings of courts depends upon public
confidence in the integrity and indepen-
dence of judges.” CODE OF CONDUCT
Canon 1 cmt. Public confidence in judi-
cial impartiality cannot survive if judges,
in disregard of their ethical obligations,
pander to the press.
We recognize that it would be extraor-
dinary to disqualify a judge for bias or
appearance of partiality when his remarks
arguably reflected what he learned, or
what he thought he learned, during the
proceedings. See Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 554-55 (1994); United
States v. Barry, 961 F.2d 260, 263 (D.C.
Cir. 1992). But this “extrajudicial source”
rule has no bearing on the case before us.
The problem here is not just what the
District Judge said, but to whom he said it
and when. His crude characterizations of
Microsoft, his frequent denigrations of
Bill Gates, his mule trainer analogy as a
reason for his remedy—all of these
remarks and others might not have given
rise to a violation of the Canons or of §
455(a) had he uttered them from the
bench. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56;
CODE OF CONDUCT Canon 3A(6) (excep-
tion to prohibition on public comments
for “statements made in the course of the
judge’s official duties”). But then
Microsoft would have had an opportunity
to object, perhaps even to persuade, and
the Judge would have made a record for
review on appeal. It is an altogether dif-
ferent matter when the statements are
made outside the courtroom, in private
meetings unknown to the parties, in
anticipation that ultimately the Judge’s
remarks would be reported. Rather than
manifesting neutrality and impartiality,
the reports of the interviews with the
District Judge convey the impression of a
judge posturing for posterity, trying to
please the reporters with colorful analo-
gies and observations bound to wind up
in the stories they write. Members of the
public may reasonably question whether
the District Judge’s desire for press cover-
age influenced his judgments, indeed
whether a publicity-seeking judge might
consciously or subconsciously seek the
publicity-maximizing outcome. We
believe, therefore, that the District Judge’s
interviews with reporters created an
appearance that he was not acting impar-
tially, [253 F.3d at 116] as the Code of
Conduct and § 455(a) require.
D. Remedies for Judicial Misconduct
and Appearance of Partiality
1. DISQUALIFICATION
Disqualification is mandatory for con-
duct that calls a judge’s impartiality into
question. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); In re
School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 783
(3d Cir. 1992). Section 455 does not pre-
scribe the scope of disqualification.
Rather, Congress “delegated to the judi-
ciary the task of fashioning the remedies
that will best serve the purpose” of the
disqualification statute.  Liljeberg, 486
U.S. at 862.
At a minimum, § 455(a) requires
prospective disqualification of the offend-
ing judge, that is, disqualification from
the judge’s hearing any further proceed-
ings in the case. See United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463-65
(D.C. Cir. 1995)(per curiam)(“Microsoft
I”). Microsoft urges retroactive disqualifi-
cation of the District Judge, which would
entail disqualification antedated to an ear-
lier part of the proceedings and vacatur of
all subsequent acts. Cf. In re School
Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 786 (discussing
remedy options).
“There need not be a draconian rem-
edy for every violation of § 455(a).”
Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 862. Liljeberg held
that a district judge could be disqualified
under § 455(a) after entering final judg-
ment in a case, even though the judge was
not (but should have been) aware of the
grounds for disqualification before final
judgment. The Court identified three fac-
tors relevant to the question whether
vacatur is appropriate: “in determining
whether a judgment should be vacated for
a violation of § 455(a), it is appropriate to
consider the risk of injustice to the parties
in the particular case, the risk that the
denial of relief will produce injustice in
other cases, and the risk of undermining
the public’s confidence in the judicial
process.” Id. at 864. Although the Court
was discussing § 455(a) in a slightly dif-
ferent context (the judgment there had
become final after appeal and the movant
sought to have it vacated under Rule
60(b)), we believe the test it propounded
applies as well to cases such as this in
which the full extent of the disqualifying
circumstances came to light only while
the appeal was pending. See In re School
Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 785.
Our application of Liljeberg leads us to
conclude that the appropriate remedy for
the violations of § 455(a) is disqualifica-
tion of the District Judge retroactive only
to the date he entered the order breaking
up Microsoft. We therefore will vacate
that order in its entirety and remand this
case to a different District Judge, but will
not set aside the existing Findings of Fact
or Conclusions of Law (except insofar as
specific findings are clearly erroneous or
legal conclusions are incorrect).
This partially retroactive disqualifica-
tion minimizes the risk of injustice to the
parties and the damage to public confi-
dence in the judicial process. Although
the violations of the Code of Conduct and
§ 455(a) were serious, full retroactive dis-
qualification is unnecessary. It would
unduly penalize plaintiffs, who were
innocent and unaware of the misconduct,
and would have only slight marginal
deterrent effect.
Most important, full retroactive dis-
qualification is unnecessary to protect
Microsoft’s right to an impartial adjudica-
tion. The District Judge’s conduct
destroyed the appearance of impartiality.
Microsoft neither alleged nor demon-
strated that it rose to the level of actual
bias or prejudice. There is no reason to
presume that everything the District
Judge did is suspect. [253 F.3d at 117]  See
In re Allied-Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 974, 975-
76 (1st Cir. 1989); cf.  Liberty Lobby, Inc. v.
Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1301-02
(D.C. Cir. 1988). Although Microsoft
challenged very few of the findings as
clearly erroneous, we have carefully
reviewed the entire record and discern no
basis to suppose that actual bias infected
his factual findings.
The most serious judicial misconduct
occurred near or during the remedial
stage. It is therefore commensurate that
our remedy focus on that stage of the
case. The District Judge’s impatience with
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what he viewed as intransigence on the
part of the company; his refusal to allow
an evidentiary hearing; his analogizing
Microsoft to Japan at the end of World
War II; his story about the mule—all of
these out-of-court remarks and others,
plus the Judge’s evident efforts to please
the press, would give a reasonable,
informed observer cause to question his
impartiality in ordering the company split
in two.
To repeat, we disqualify the District
Judge retroactive only to the imposition of
the remedy, and thus vacate the remedy
order for the reasons given in Section V
and because of the appearance of partiality
created by the District Judge’s misconduct.
2. REVIEW OF FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Given the limited scope of our disqual-
ification of the District Judge, we have let
stand for review his Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. The severity of the
District Judge’s misconduct and the
appearance of partiality it created have led
us to consider whether we can and should
subject his factfindings to greater scrutiny.
For a number of reasons we have rejected
any such approach.
The Federal Rules require that district
court findings of fact not be set aside
unless they are clearly erroneous. See FED
R. CIV. P. 52(a). Ordinarily, there is no
basis for doubting that the District Court’s
factual findings are entitled to the sub-
stantial deference the clearly erroneous
standard entails. But of course this is no
ordinary case. Deference to a district
court’s factfindings presumes impartiality
on the lower court’s part. When impartial-
ity is called into question, how much def-
erence is due?
The question implies that there is some
middle ground, but we believe there is
none. As the rules are written, district
court factfindings receive either full defer-
ence under the clearly erroneous standard
or they must be vacated. There is no de
novo appellate review of factfindings and
no intermediate level between de novo and
clear error, not even for findings the court
of appeals may consider sub-par. See
Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 228
(1988)(“The District Court’s lack of preci-
sion, however, is no excuse for the Court
of Appeals to ignore the dictates of Rule
52(a) and engage in impermissible appel-
late factfinding.”); Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 571-75
(1985)(criticizing district court practice
of adopting a party’s proposed factfindings
but overturning court of appeals’ applica-
tion of “close scrutiny” to such findings). 
Rule 52(a) mandates clearly erroneous
review of all district court factfindings:
“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge of the credibility of
the witnesses.” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). The
rule “does not make exceptions or purport
to exclude certain categories of factual
findings from the obligation of a court of
[253 F.3d at 118] appeals to accept a dis-
trict court’s findings unless clearly erro-
neous.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U.S. 273, 287 (1982); see also Anderson,
470 U.S. at 574-75; Inwood Labs., Inc. v.
Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855-58
(1982). The Supreme Court has empha-
sized on multiple occasions that “in apply-
ing the clearly erroneous standard to the
findings of a district court sitting without
a jury, appellate courts must constantly
have in mind that their function is not to
decide factual issues de novo.” Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
U.S. 100, 123 (1969); Anderson, 470 U.S.
at 573 (quoting Zenith).
The mandatory nature of Rule 52(a)
does not compel us to accept factfindings
that result from the District Court’s mis-
application of governing law or that oth-
erwise do not permit meaningful appel-
late review. See Pullman-Standard, 456
U.S. at 292; Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 855
n.15. Nor must we accept findings that
are utterly deficient in other ways. In such
a case, we vacate and remand for further
factfinding. See 9 MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 52.12[1] (Matthew Bender 3d
ed. 2000); 9A CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2577, at 514-22 (2d ed.
1995); cf.  Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v.
Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 (1986);
Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 291-92.
When there is fair room for argument
that the District Court’s factfindings
should be vacated in toto, the court of
appeals should be especially careful in
determining that the findings are worthy
of the deference Rule 52(a) prescribes.
See, e.g., Thermo Electron Corp. v.
Schiavone Constr. Co., 915 F.2d 770, 773
(1st Cir. 1990); cf. Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984). Thus, although
Microsoft alleged only appearance of bias,
not actual bias, we have reviewed the
record with painstaking care and have dis-
cerned no evidence of actual bias. See S.
Pac. Communications Co. v. AT & T, 740
F.2d 980, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Cooley, 1
F.3d at 996 (disqualifying district judge
for appearance of partiality but noting
that “the record of the proceedings below
. . .  discloses no bias”).
In light of this conclusion, the District
Judge’s factual findings both warrant def-
erence under the clear error standard of
review and, though exceedingly sparing
in citations to the record, permit mean-
ingful appellate review. In reaching these
conclusions, we have not ignored the
District Judge’s reported intention to craft
his factfindings and Conclusions of Law
to minimize the breadth of our review.
The Judge reportedly told Ken Auletta
that “what I want to do is confront the
Court of Appeals with an established fac-
tual record which is a fait accompli.” He
explained: “part of the inspiration for
doing that is that I take mild offense at
their reversal of my preliminary injunc-
tion in the consent-decree case, where
they went ahead and made up about
ninety percent of the facts on their own.”
Id.  Whether the District Judge takes
offense, mild or severe, is beside the
point. Appellate decisions command
compliance, not agreement. We do not
view the District Judge’s remarks as any-
thing other than his expression of dis-
agreement with this court’s decision, and
his desire to provide extensive factual
findings in this case, which he did.
VII. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the District Court is
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and [253
F.3d at 119] remanded in part. We vacate
in full the Final Judgment embodying the
remedial order, and remand the case to the
District Court for reassignment to a differ-
ent trial judge for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
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More on Impending Proceedings
In his reply to my commentary on Free Speech for Judges
(Winter 2001), Professor Steven Lubet misquotes my proposal.
Making my proposal appear more restrictive on judicial
speech than it is in fact, Professor Lubet says: “Professor
Freedman’s own proposal sweeps much more broadly, as it
would apply to all ‘issues’ in a ‘contested case,’ and not merely
to identifiable, impending proceedings.”
Actually, my proposed rule would apply only if there is a
reasonable possibility that the same “issue [discussed by the
judge] will be contested” in a case that will come before the
judge.  Thus, to take Professor Lubet’s illustration, it is possi-
ble that perjury cases will come before Judge Posner, but it is
exceedingly unlikely that the same issue of materiality pre-
sented in President Clinton’s case will be contested in a case
before Judge Posner.
Monroe H. Freedman
Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor
of Legal Ethics
Hofstra University School of Law
Hempstead, New York
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NEW BOOKS
STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH:
WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON’T, CAN’T, AND
SHOULDN’T HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE
TRUTH.  New York Univ. Press, 2001.
($38).  198 pp.
We have to admit that we started out
rooting for this book even before we
knew what it was about.  After all,
Steven Lubet is both a member of Court
Review’s editorial board and a frequent
contributor.   Then we learned that the
book was a essentially a defense of the
way trials are conducted in the
American legal system, the very place
many of us spend most of our working
lives.  After getting the book and read-
ing it, we’re pretty sure most judges
would both enjoy it and find its com-
ments intriguing.
To be sure, Lubet’s hero is the trial
lawyer, not the trial judge.  But he has
written a book that is so clearly
grounded in the realities of the trial
process that anyone who has spent
time there will find many moments of
recognition.  
Many judges, no doubt, have from
time to time been tempted to think—
as do many in the public at large—that
trials are as far from a search for truth
as one could get.  (These thoughts are
most apt to come on a day in which
inept lawyers have taken positions on
both sides of the courtroom.)  Lubet
contends, however, that the purposive
storytelling engaged in by good
lawyers is the key to the success of the
adversary system.  In a brief introduc-
tion, he explains the importance of
having a case theory and theme; he
also contends that the “story frame”
may be the most important element.
For example, he notes that the prose-
cutors in the O.J. Simpson case used a
domestic violence story frame, hoping
that jurors would view events in that
context, while the defense used a
police prejudice story frame, advanc-
ing the theory that officers must have
contrived or mishandled the evidence
against Simpson.  
Lubet then explores what he calls
the messy process of getting to the
truth at trial by focusing on several
cases, both real and fictional.  He
includes John Brown and Wyatt Earp,
as well as Liberty Valance and Atticus
Finch.  In each of the seven chapters,
he develops his theme against both the
record of these actual or fictional trials
and the contexts in which they arose.  
As Lubet notes, and most of us who
have endured long trials would agree,
“More facts produce less clarity.”
Thus, a good trial lawyer does a service
to the search for truth by organizing
the narratives, including facts that fit
and omitting those that do not, so that
the trier of fact can form conclusions
about what happened.  If, on a bad day,
you find yourself having doubts about
“the system,” this is the book to pick
up and read.
o
WEBSITE UPDATES
Public Trust & Confidence Update
http://www.ncsc.dni.us/PTC.HTM 
In May 1999, the National Conference
on Public Trust and Confidence in the
Justice System brought together over 500
representatives of the bench, bar, and
public to address the state of public confi-
dence in the courts.  The fall 1999 issue of
Court Review included all the major pre-
sentations given during the conference
and an overview of the emerging national
action plan to improve public trust.  
During the conference, United States
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor told attendees that “the mea-
sure of this conference will be what hap-
pens when you return home, what you do
about the conclusions and ideas discussed
here.” Based on a recent survey of public
trust and confidence activities, many
states continue to work diligently to
improve court performance and enhance
public trust. The 1999 conference identi-
fied 15 issues that contribute to low trust
and confidence.  At least a few states are
working on each issue.  A majority are
focusing on issues related to judicial iso-
lation, lack of public understanding, and
poor customer relations with the public.
Several states also are concentrating on
the conference’s top-priority issues of
unequal treatment in—and the high cost
of access to—the justice system.  For
more information on each state’s efforts
and on the national action plan to
improve public trust and confidence, visit
the online forum on public trust and con-
fidence in the justice system at the web-
site address listed above.  
U.S. v. Microsoft Update
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/
legalnews.asp
h t t p : / / w w w. u s d o j . g o v / a t r / c a s e s /
ms_index.htm 
In our Winter 2001 issue, we reprinted
portions of the appellate briefs in the
Microsoft antitrust case.  The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has
now agreed with Microsoft’s argument
that the trial judge’s extensive contacts
with the media were improper (see the
Focus section noted below). As this issue
went to press, Microsoft had filed a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court based solely on the
trial court misconduct issue. The websites
listed above contain most of the court
pleadings filed in the case both by
Microsoft and by the United States
Department of Justice.
FOCUS ON THE 
MICROSOFT CASE
In the Resource Page Focus section last
issue, we presented the briefs on appeal in
the Microsoft antitrust case dealing with
the trial judges’ conduct.  We didn’t know
at that time whether the appellate court
would find this issue of importance in
deciding the appeal.  It did, and we have
reprinted the appellate court’s views in
this issue, beginning at page 25.
g
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